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Abstract 
Within the frame of contemporary reform rhetoric, the Ethiopian government has recently 
embarked on comprehensive structural reorganization of all public institutions under the 
Business Process Reengineering (BPR) program. Nevertheless, the orientation it followed 
in implementing the reform is quite different from the top-down approach it had 
traditionally been pursuing. Instead of arriving at a set of centrally predetermined reform 
plans, it pursued atomistic approach in which individual institutions are given autonomy 
to implement their own reform. Being public institution, the country’s universities have 
implemented this reform since the mid 2000’s. Drawing on the experience of three 
universities i.e. Addis Ababa University (AAU), Hawassa University (HU) and Mekele 
University (MU), this study set out to assess how the universities’ academic governance 
and management process is affected by this reform initiative. In doing so, it also tries to 
reflect on whether the presence of autonomy leads to increasing or decreasing level of 
structural diversity in the context of developing world. In conceptualizing the universities 
organizational response, the environment-organization relationship embedded in the neo-
institutional and resource dependency approaches is used as a basic analytical point of 
departure. The analysis of the universities’ new structures indicated a common departure 
from collective to strong executive leadership ideals in all the three universities though 
modest institutional dissimilarity is found. No matter how limited its role deemed to be, 
the government is found to have played circuitously decisive role in shaping the 
universities response. However, the empirical functioning of the structures as perceived 
by sampled academic leaders and staffs revealed that governmental inducements have not 
so far proved to be capable of generating the desired change practically. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1  Background of the study 
The overthrow of Ethiopia’s Marxist military government in 1991 coupled with the 
international collapse of communism brought the infusion of market oriented ideology to 
the country. This coupled with the global rise of neo-liberalism necessitated a nationwide 
structural and institutional reform. In line with this, since its ascendancy to power, the 
incumbent government has been undertaking a wide variety of reforms aimed at realigning 
the country’s social, political and economic institutions to fit to the new milieu. Spanning 
over three phases  (1991-1995, 1996–2000 and 2001 onwards),  the reform agenda 
revolves around not only redefining the role of institutions but also laying down the basis 
for new forms of organization, governance and steering (Mengesha and Common 2007). 
As part of this deliberation, the country’s higher education (HE) sector has been 
entangling with fundamental reorganizations ranging from redefining governance and 
curriculum to revitalizing individual institutions over the past two decades (see Saint 
2004, Yizengaw 2003).  
Even though these endeavors brought remarkable change at macro level, the changes are 
found to be far from being realized at meso level, among other things, due to the 
resistance of the academic community to change (HESO 2004, Yizengaw 2003). 
According to Yizengaw (2003), the top-down elitist approach of implementing reforms in 
the universities before anyone discusses what they are meant for is one of the major 
reasons. Moreover, the first reforms in the early days of the new government were 
motivated to bring the country’s institutions under the functional needs of incumbent 
politicians (Clapham 1995 in Mengesha and Common 2007). Eventually, the first waves 
of reforms were caught in the ambush of systematic resistance by the academic 
community. As a consequence, except for the minor changes realized either as 
complimentary or incremental to the existing system, the universities’ internal dynamics 
remained more or less intact (Yizengaw 2003, HESO 2004).  
However, with the decision of the government to launch a nationwide fundamental 
restructuring, a new wave of reform movement has regained momentum recently. In the 
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early 2000’s, the government has examined the status of ongoing reforms in consultation 
with IMF and World Bank. In the assessment, the country’s bureaucracy has been found 
to be the most impeding and bottlenecking. The extremely hierarchical non-value adding 
levels and input-oriented systems in the country’s public institutions are signaled out as 
prime cause for lack of transparency, accountability, effective leadership and thereby high 
level of nepotism and corruption. To this end, with the ambition of realizing system 
overhaul, the government has embarked since the year 2002 on a comprehensive structural 
reorganization of all public institutions under the Business Process Reengineering 
program (BPR). Being public institution, universities in Ethiopia have implemented this 
reform since the mid 2000’s. 
Nevertheless, the orientation the government pursued in implementing the new reform is 
quite different from the top-down approach it had traditionally been pursuing. Instead of 
arriving at a set of centrally predetermined reform plans, its approach to the BPR reform 
is based on an atomistic theme in which the restructuring of an institution is assumed to 
relate to the sector’s nature and an individual institution’s contextual reality. Thus, the 
government adopted a federalized approach in which authority is shared between the 
government, whose role is limited to coordinating the overall reform process at arm’s-
length, and the individual public institutions, which are granted autonomy to implement 
their own reform. Even though not intentionally developed for the sector, this approach 
goes hand in glove with HE’s contemporary metaphor in which independent decisions by 
individual institutions is assumed to produce better results than is possible through central 
planning. In view of this, this study is geared to see how higher education institutions 
(HEIs)1 in Ethiopia restructured their governance and management system in response to 
this BPR reform.  
 
 
 
                                               
1
 According to the 2009 proclamation (HEP 2009), HEI in Ethiopia  is defined as an institution offering 
Bachelors degree and above programs. Hence, it excludes institutions offering technical and vocational 
programs. 
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1.2   Research Question 
1.2.1 Problem Statement  
In order to address persistent problems of inefficiency, ineffectiveness and non-
responsiveness in delivering organizational services, BPR proposes a fundamental and 
radical shift in organizational logics from task-based to process-based thinking (see 
Davenport & Short 1990, Hammers 1990, Hammers & Champy 1993). It aims at finding 
new ways of organizing tasks, structures, positions and people in organizational settings 
according to process thinking instead of the traditional task-based logic so that an 
institution’s operation would be altered not incrementally but radically. Hence, its 
implementation in Ethiopian universities casts question as to how the universities 
governance and management system is transformed in response to the reform initiative. 
However, as stressed in the background section, instead of arriving at a set of fixed reform 
plans, the government’s approach to this reform is that individual institutions are given 
the mandate to implement their own reform within the scope of national guidelines. The 
implicit assumption behind this approach is that even if each institution is supposed to 
carry out the BPR implementation independently, the reform would lead institutions to be 
effective, efficient and responsive to the society’s socio-economic requirements as long as 
each institution adheres to the national guidelines. However, by its very nature, such 
approach is so decentralized that it gives local actors room to maneuver as per their own 
interests and local context. Even though it provides a mechanism to inculcate locally 
important realities, efforts to introduce such approaches in HE are reported to have 
resulted in divergent and partly contradictory arrangements (Maassen & Stensaker 2003). 
This sets the ground not only for wondering how the universities are restructured, but also 
examining whether the overall reform will lead to structural homogenization or 
heterogenization across the universities. In line with this, the overall research problem 
driving this study is formulated as follows: 
• How have Ethiopian universities restructured their internal governance in response 
to the BPR reform? 
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1.2.2 Specific Research Questions 
To address the overall research problem, the following specific questions are used as 
frame of reference. 
1. How did the internal governance structure of the universities change as a 
consequence of the BPR reform? 
2. How is the organization of academic units and their autonomy affected by the 
implementation of the BPR reform? 
3. How has the implementation of the BPR reform affected the power and role of 
constituents in the universities in general, and the academic leaders and academic 
staff in particular? 
4. How has the BPR reform and its implementation by the individual universities 
influenced the level of structural diversity across the country’s universities?  
1.3  Objectives of the study 
This study’s objectives are twofold. Basically, it is aimed at uncovering how universities 
in Ethiopia are restructured in response to the BPR reform and thereby revealing the path 
of the transformation. In addition, the study is also meant to examine whether autonomy 
and local discretion lead to increasing or decreasing level of structural diversity. 
Empirical studies in the context of the developed world suggest a drive to convergence 
(see Birnbaum 1983, Rhoades 1990, Huisman 1995, Meek et al 1996, Van Vught 1996 & 
2009). There is no as such empirical evidence regarding the developing world’s 
experience except extending Altbach’s (1998) center-periphery interpretation in which 
developing countries’ HEIs are expected to follow the paths of their developed 
counterparts’. In this regard, since implementing the BPR reform in Ethiopia gives 
relative autonomy to institutions, it provides suitable ground to empirically examine the 
drive towards structural homogenization versus heterogenization as a function of 
autonomy in the context of the developing world. Thus, abreast with uncovering the path 
of structural transformation, this study is also meant to shade preliminary light on this 
issue. 
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1.4  Scope of the study 
Over the past two decades, there have been lots of reform agenda with respect to the 
Ethiopian HE sector. To have broad understanding of the level and outcome of the 
transformation, it would have been preferable if this study had been done 
comprehensively. But, due to limited monetary, time and related constraints, this is not 
possible. Owing to this, the study is confined in specific reference to the BPR reform in 
the country’s universities. Apart from this, as Hammer and Champy (1993) described, 
BPR is about bringing radical organizational transformation in the whole aspect of 
organizational life. This in a university setting implies change in both the academic and 
administrative components. The study is, however, concerned with the academic 
component in general and its governance and management system in particular. Therefore, 
it is focused on how the governance structures, distribution of authority, the mechanism 
and nature of decision making and the nature of relationships attached to positions and 
committees are transformed. Alongside this central issue, as addressed in the problem 
statement, the study is also aimed at examining how the level of diversity across the 
universities is influenced by the reform. The concept of diversity in higher education 
encompasses several aspects. Birnbaum 1983 (in Van Vught 2009: 1-2) has identified 
seven categories.  
• System diversity – differences in institutional type, size and control in a given 
system. 
• Structural diversity – institutional differences accrued in differences in the internal 
distribution of authority among individual institutions. 
• Programmatic diversity – differences in the degree level, degree area, 
comprehensiveness, mission and emphasis of programmes and services provided 
by institutions. 
• Procedural diversity - differences in the ways that teaching, research and services 
are provided by institutions. 
• Reputational diversity – difference in the perceived differences in institutions 
based on status and prestige. 
• Constituential diversity - differences in constituents in the institutions (students, 
faculty, administration, etc.) 
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• Values and climate diversity - differences in social environment and culture. 
In view of these categories, institutional diversity as explored in this study refers to 
institutional differences accrued in the distribution of authority. The focus is thus on 
structural differences among individual HEIs in terms of their internal governance 
arrangements before and after the BPR reform. 
1.5  Significance of the study 
Though the BPR reform has been initiated some years ago, no systematic inquiry has been 
undertaken to see how the reform affected universities, whether there is a general trend in 
the reforms adopted by the universities and whether it is in line with the expectations. In 
view of this, this study is meant to contribute to the understanding of the reform that will 
be useful to policy makers, HE officers, practitioners, university leaders, academicians, 
and other stakeholders in the country’s HE sector. Additionally, it contributes to the 
literature on the wave of reforms in the developing countries’ HE sector. Alongside this, it 
will give empirical evidence regarding the drive towards structural homogenization versus 
heterogenization as a function of institutional autonomy and local discretion in the context 
of developing countries.  It can also serve as an empirical basis for further research in the 
area. 
1.6  Research approach and methodology 
1.6.1 Research design 
In order to comprehensively describe the issue at national level, it would be ideal if the 
study was designed in such a way that it would be able to show the overall picture as 
intensively and extensively as possible. However, as there are no previous studies 
conducted in reference to the issue under consideration, it would be difficult to have the 
ground to explore further in explanatory manner. For this reason, this study is delineated 
to be descriptive in its nature. Apart from this, in order to broadly describe the issue in a 
more credible way, data from as many universities as possible should be pooled for 
making comparative research possible and thereby identify divergence or convergence 
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trends among universities. To this effect, in the framework of this study, cross-university 
comparative research has been included by selecting three universities. To enhance the 
validity of the study, multiple data sources are used. The main source is the archive of 
documents in the universities and concerned governmental office in general and target 
universities blueprint organizational documents developed after the BPR reform in 
particular. This is backed up by three complementary but analytically separable data 
sources from each selected university namely, i.e. BPR team members, academic leaders, 
and academic staff.  
1.6.2 Sample and sampling technique 
The selection of universities and respondents in this study can be seen as two level 
sampling: the first - deciding which universities to include and the second, selecting 
respondents from the targeted universities. Regarding the first, the sample is thought to be 
diversified enough to reveal the general trend across the country’s universities more 
clearly if the selection is based on the universities’ historical foundation and the 
orientation the government customarily pursues in implementing policies in the 
universities. Historically, the universities’ background has a pattern that makes some 
universities more similar than others. In this regard, with the exception of Mekele, all the 
country’s older universities - namely Bahirdar, Haromaya, Hawassa and Jima - are 
originated out of the Addis Ababa University structural model as they were once integral 
part of this university (See the next chapter for detail). Later on, during the recent wave of 
expansion (since the late 2000’s), these universities served in their respective region as a 
nucleus out of which most of the new universities emerged. In line with this, whenever the 
need arises such as in implementing policies, the government has often opted to cluster 
the universities. In this regard, there are six cluster groups – a Northern group led by 
Mekele University, a Northwestern group led by Bahirdar University, a Southwestern 
group led by Jima University, a Southern group led by Hawassa University, an Eastern 
group led by Haromaya University and a Central group led by Addis Ababa University. 
Each university is normally advised by the government to perform peer-to-peer experience 
sharing with other universities in its cluster. Hence, the assumption here is that if these 
senior universities are used as representative of their respective cluster, they will as a 
consequence represent the rest. But, including all the six universities is not feasible. Thus, 
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three out of the six, namely Hawassa, Addis Ababa and Mekele are selected as these are 
relatively convenient and more easily accessible to the researcher than the other three.  
Regarding the selection of respondents from the targeted universities, different approaches 
are used according to the data source used. As far as BPR team members are concerned, 
preference is given to contact BPR team coordinators whenever possible as the role of 
members in the team is different affecting their exposure to the reform. The same goes for 
approaching academic leaders at the institution level as the positions they occupy enable 
them to have a better exposure to have a comprehensive view of the reform in their 
respective university. As far as selecting faculty deans and department heads is concerned, 
they are contacted on availability and convenience basis. When it comes to selecting 
academic staff, whenever possible preference is given to academic staff having more than 
5 year experience as those with lower experience do not have exposure regarding the 
system at work before the reform, and hence, can’t reflect on the newly implemented 
system in comparison to the previous system. Though 2 BPR coordinators, 2 academic 
leaders at the institution level, 3 at the faculty level, 4 at the department level and 30 
academic staff at grass root level from each university were planned to be included, the 
actual number of respondents is reduced partly due to the high level of hesitation 
especially among academic leaders to take part in the study and partly due to the 
unavailability of desired officials. Consequently, a total of 82 academic staffs at grass root 
level (24, 29 and 29 from AAU, HU and MU respectively), 3 BPR team members (one 
from each university), 2 academic leaders at institution level (from HU and MU), 4 
academic leaders at faculty level (1, 2 and 1 from AAU, HU and MU respectively) and 6 
academic leaders at department level (1, 3 and 2 from AAU, HU and MU respectively) 
have participated. 
1.6.3 Data gathering methods and analysis procedure 
Different data gathering techniques were used according to the source used. As far as the 
archive documents are concerned, document analysis of senate legislation and 
organizational structure documents of the target universities before the reform is 
conducted for examining the previous system. In addition to this, documents and reports 
in connection to BPR in Ethiopia in general and the targeted universities (draft and final 
versions) in particular have been studied. When it comes to gathering data from members 
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of the BPR teams and academic leaders at all levels, in depth semi-structured interviews 
were employed. A close-ended questionnaire has been administered to gather data from 
academic staff as doing interview with this group was evidently not feasible.   
Questions for the interviews and the questionnaire were developed in such a way that they 
reflected the indicators set up in the analytical framework (see the third chapter for the 
detail on the analytical framework). In this regard, related studies on institutional 
governance such as the International Research Project on the Academic Profession 
published by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in particular have 
been referred (see Altbach 1996). The full description of the interview guide and 
questionnaire is provided in Appendix D. Both the interview and questionnaire were 
administered in 2011 summer. The interview was conducted in Ethiopia’s official 
language Amharic and afterwards, it was transcribed in English by the researcher for the 
use of the study.  
The analysis is organized in such a way that it provides a comprehensive review of the 
status quo preceding the reform initiative first and then portrays how the universities are 
transformed. In the first stages of the analysis, a review of the dynamics of institutional 
governance in Ethiopian universities before the BPR initiative has been done. In the 
second stage, an analysis of the three universities followed by a comparative summary of 
all the three universities is conducted in procedural way. In line with this, the data gained 
from documents is systematically reviewed and organized according to the issue it deals 
with. In the same way, the data gained from interviews was converted into a written form 
and organized, as was data collected via the questionnaire. Then, both primary and 
secondary data gathered for each university were pooled together. Next, a thorough 
examination and analysis based on the analytical framework developed for each university 
was conducted. After the analysis for each university was done, in the latter stage of the 
analysis, cross-university comparisons and contrast analysis were conducted to provide a 
descriptive explanation of common and contrasting patterns in the universities’ newly 
adopted structures.  
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1.6.4 Reliability and Validity of the study 
Though reliability and validity are prominent to a quantitative perspective, they are as 
much relevant to qualitative studies as well (Babbie 2007, Bryan & Teevan 2005:148 ). 
However, due to the inherent difference between the two perspectives in terms of 
measurement, epistemological foundation and ontological considerations, their meaning is 
argued to need alteration to fit the qualitative discourse (Bryan & Teevan 2005:148-151). 
In this regard, Lincoln and Guba (1994 in Bryan & Teevan 2005:150) proposed four 
qualitative research criteria – credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability 
each of which has equivalent criterion in quantitative research - internal validity, external 
validity, reliability and objectivity respectively. These set of criteria are assumed as a 
point of reference to ensure this study’s reliability and validity. In line with this, one way 
methodological triangulation that relates to the use of different data sources, i.e. primary 
data sources alongside secondary data, is used to enhance the credibility of the study. 
Each source is assumed to have a role to reflect on the issue from different angle. Data 
gained from BPR members is expected to highlight the rationales and assumptions for 
developing the new structures, whereas the data from the academic administrators and 
academic staff gives an internal view on the new arrangements from the top and the 
bottom of the organizational hierarchy respectively. An attempt is also made to augment 
this further by coupling the qualitative analysis with quantitative one though in a limited 
way. Besides, to ensure a good match between the analysis and the concept it is supposed 
to denote, the questions for the interview and the questionnaire were developed by 
referring to internationally renowned study in the area - the International Research Project 
on the Academic Profession by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 
(Altbach 1996). With respect to dependability, all phases of the study ranging from 
methodological choice and selection of sample cases to interview transcripts and data 
analysis procedures have not only been clearly sorted out but also strictly followed. 
Hence, all respondents were presented with the same set of questions though the questions 
posed through interview are adjusted to fit the formal role of respondents. Though the 
interviews were recorded and transcribed, the fact that they were translated by a non-
professional translator (the researcher himself) may pose an issue. Even so, an attempt is 
made to make sure that the respondents’ responses are reflected as accurately as possible. 
Likewise, in order to enhance the transferability of the findings to other HEIs in the 
country, the sampled universities were selected in such a way that they are diversified and 
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relevant enough to represent other institutions as well. Even then, it is obvious that what 
holds for the sampled institutions may not be necessarily applicable to the context of other 
institutions especially junior ones. In this regard, Lincolin and Guba (1994 in Bryan & 
Teevan 2005:150) stressed the essence of providing thick description of the issue under 
consideration. In line with this, in this study as much care as possible is given to making 
the analysis as comprehensive and insightful as possible so that it would provide a 
database for making reasonable judgments about other universities’ milieus.  
1.6.5 Limitation of the study 
Limitations of this study can be seen from two aspects – methodological and practical 
issues. In reference to the first, targeting three universities presents a very difficult 
situation though having as many universities as possible is desirable for the study’s 
reliability. Even though all the three universities work under similar conditions, it does 
not mean that they share the same context. Each institution has its own context which in 
turn makes the inter-university comparison wary and complicated. This along with the 
generalizing nature of the study made it more descriptive. In view of this, the researcher 
does not want to pretend that the study would provide a comprehensive account of the 
universities’ experience. However, conducting the study in such comparative way is 
thought to provide insights across the universities. Besides, though the target universities 
are selected in such a way that they represent other universities in the country, the 
omission of junior universities in the sample may limit the applicability of the conclusions 
drawn to all institutions. 
As far as practical issues are concerned, one of the major challenges is in relation to 
timing. Though the researcher planned to undertake the fieldwork before the summer 
holiday for Ethiopian universities began, this turned out to be impossible in practice. 
Eventually by the time the researcher went for field survey, finding desired respondents 
was difficult. This was further goaded by operational intricacies related to respondents’ 
reluctance to take part in the study. Consequently, the actual number of respondents was 
lower than planned. Nonetheless, effort has been made to generate sufficient data for 
addressing the research questions. Additionally, the researcher also came across great 
difficulty in getting secondary data from the respective universities due to the reservation 
by some officials in the respective institutions. Thus, even though sufficient data has been 
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gained on the focal issues, some documents were not accessed. These operational 
challenges along with the possible individual based bias can have a bearing on the 
findings of the study.          
1.7  Organization of the study 
This study is organized into five chapters. The first chapter sets out the study’s 
background and methodological approach. Chapter two presents the Ethiopian HE context 
within which the study is conducted. Chapter three draws on the study’s analytical 
framework. Chapter four presents the analysis, interpretation and summery of findings. 
The last chapter provides conclusionary remark about the overall aspects of the study. 
13 
 
2 Setting the Context 
Though a thorough analysis of the development of HE in Ethiopia does not serve the 
study’s purpose, brief examination of historical patterns and present features helps to 
understand the dynamics of the sector in the country. With this in mind, in this chapter, an 
attempt is made to provide a descriptive explanation of the sector’s past and present 
experience and the historical background of the targeted universities.  
2.1  Higher Education in Ethiopia – Past and Present  
Education in Ethiopia has a long history. The country has an old elite educational system 
linked to its Orthodox Church (MOE 2011B, Pankhurst 1986, Saint 2004: VI). Although 
the presence of inscriptions before the introduction of Christianity into the country shows 
the precedence of literacy over Christianity, the country’s traditional didactic system is 
deeply rooted in its Orthodox Church. As early as the 4th century, the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church set up a comprehensive system of education where formal education from 
preschool through advanced level is given on theology, philosophy, computation, civil 
law, canonical law, astronomy, history, poetry and music (Ajayi et al. 1996, Pankhurst 
1986, Wagaw 1979).  
In spite of this antiquity educational heritage, modern secular education in the country 
was initiated at the turn of the 20th century (Saint 2004, MEO 2011B). However, higher 
education was started only as recent as the 1950’s with the founding of the then 
University College of Addis Ababa. This was followed by a stagnant establishment of a 
few public institutions geographically dispersed in and around major urban settlements in 
the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. In the early 1960’s, all colleges in the country were 
reorganized and pooled together under Addis Ababa University (the then Haile Selassie I 
University) (Tamirat 2008, Wagaw 1990).  
In its early life, Addis Ababa University along with its several colleges in various parts of 
the country was able to keep up with international standards with a considerable success 
(Saint 2004). However, due to the extreme circumcision of its autonomy by the then 
military junta government, this couldn’t continue long. In its 1977 proclamation, the then 
military government established the Commission for Higher Education (CHE) through 
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which it micro-managed the HEIs. This centrally controlled system made change, 
innovation and responsiveness difficult for the HEIs. Eventually, while universities in 
many other countries have accomplished profound change, little or no changes to augment 
the changing national as well as global realities occurred in Ethiopian universities untill 
recent years (Yizengaw 2003:05). Owing to this, for relatively longer time, the country’s 
higher education institutions had largely stuck to a closed system, which, in many cases, 
was out of touch with the country’s socio-economic environment. Accordingly, as the 
20th century close to drew, Ethiopia’s HE system was in absolute surrender point (Saint 
2004: VI).  
In spite of this constraining experience, the military government made modest efforts to 
expand the sector. A closer look at of the detailed account of this regime’s time reveals 
the inauguration of several junior colleges in the provinces under Addis Ababa University 
along with handful independent vocational institutions aimed at training middle level 
manpower in several fields. If anything that happened in the 1970s and 1980’s deserves a 
mention other than this, it was the promotion of Alemaya Agricultural College to a status 
of specialized university and the commencement of graduate study at Addis Ababa 
University (see Ahmed 2006, Habtamu 2003, Wagaw 1990). Consequently, until the 
1990’s enrolment in HE grew modestly but it was far below acceptable levels even by 
Sub-Saharan standard. The tertiary gross enrolment ratio showed no sign of meaningful 
improvement though it grew to 0.7% in 1995 from 0.2% in 1970 (Yizengaw 2005:02). 
Generally, the expansion of the sector in its half a century epoch was so sluggish with 
Addis Ababa University and the then Alemaya Agricultural University (now Haromaya 
University) being the only HEIs in the country for relatively longer time (Engida 2006, 
Habtamu 2003, Tamirat 2008).  
Over the last decade, however, fundamental changes have been taking place in the 
Ethiopian HE. The overthrow of the then Marxist military government in 1991 coupled 
with the international collapse of communism brought the infusion of market oriented 
ideology into the country. This eventually necessitated a country wide structural and 
institutional reform in all sectors. To this end, the new government devised a nation-wide 
deliberations aimed at transforming all public sectors. As part of this process, since the 
late 1990’s, a series of reforms targeted at aligning the country’s HE to the new scenario 
have been introduced (Saint 2004:85-87, Yizengaw 2003:05-13). Consequently, the 
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country’s higher education sector was transformed fundamentally in a wide variety of 
areas. 
The first wave of the new regime’s reform agenda came to be enacted by the mid of 
1990’s. With the promulgation of the country’s Education and Training Policy (ETP) in 
1994, an attempt to redress the country’s education system with specific deliberations at 
each level was made (see ETPTGE 1994). In line with this, the country’s education 
system has been restructured radically (See Appendix C for detail). In the HE sector, this 
has been manifested mainly in the length and curricula content of degree programs. A 
good instance in point is the duration of study for a Bachelor’s degree which has been 
reduced from 4 to 3 years with the former freshman year courses being transferred to the 
secondary school level. With respect to curriculum, a major review and upgrading which 
brought about change both in terms of content and structure has been enacted. 
Consequently, all existing diploma programmes were transferred to technical colleges 
making the universities concentrate on degree training. In a related move, new degree 
courses such as in civics, ethics, communication skills, community outreach, and 
entrepreneurship were introduced in response to the country’s anticipated needs (Saint 
2004).  
Likewise, with the ratification of the new HE Proclamation in 2003, the governance 
framework within which universities operate has been fundamentally reformed. The 2003 
statutory laid down legal framework in which the country’s universities are granted 
substantial autonomy. Furthermore, it has also resulted in a shift away from fully 
subsidized HE to a cost recovery schemes in which students share the cost of their study. 
In addition to this, it has also included the legal provision for the establishment of private 
HEIs for the first time formally although there were private institutions preceding the 
proclamation. Apart from this, it also resulted in the reorganization of the concerned 
ministerial office in such a way that the duty of the sector’s governance is entrusted to the 
two independent board steered public agencies: Higher Education Strategy Center (HESC) 
& Higher Education Relevance & Quality Agency (HERQA) (now referred to as 
Education and Training Quality Assurance Agency (ETQAA)). In general, the law 
fundamentally transformed the formal framework that determine the characteristics of the 
country’s HEIs, how they relate to the whole system, how money is allocated to them and 
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how they are held accountable (see HEP 2003 for detail). All these provisions have been 
reinforced by the recently revised 2009 proclamation (see HEP 2009 for detail). 
In a similar move, ambitious plan to expand the sector’s intake capacity especially in 
public institutions was put in place. To this effect, expansion of the sector in 
unprecedented scale has been evidenced over the past two decades. Many of the former 
colleges under Addis Ababa University were upgraded to full-fledged university and a 
number of new ones have been established (Saint 2004, Tamirat 2008, Yizengaw 2003). 
All these ultimately made the country’s achievements over the past decade little short of 
extraordinary as total enrolments have grown more than tenfold in a decade from 39,576 
in 1996/97 to 467,843 in 2010/2011 with 31 public universities, 5 special universities and 
58 private institutions in place of the previous two-university system  (MOE 2011A & 
2011C).  
2.2    Target Universities 
Moving forward with the BPR reform agenda, all universities in the country have 
conducted a complete review of their system and thereby, developed BPR reform plan 
intended to make their system robust enough to achieve the ambitious objectives set for 
the sector. As the redesigning phase neared completion, all of the HEIs in the country 
except few have fully implemented it. All the three targeted universities embarked on the 
implementation phase step by step from partial to full scale. Of the three universities, 
Mekele University has finalized implementing the reform at all levels and now with the 
ambitious move of its new expatriate president to transform the university to German 
Applied University model; it is gearing into another wave of reform (see Herzig 2010). In 
the remaining two universities, Addis Ababa University (AAU) and Hawassa University 
(HU), the reform process has now reached a stage where implementation of new 
university-wide structure is completed. The section to follow provides detailed 
background of each target university. 
2.2.1 Addis Ababa University 
The formal account of Addis Ababa University’s establishment is set on the inauguration 
date of the then University College of Addis Ababa (UCAA) in 1950.  The establishment 
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of the college was followed by the 1954 charter that laid the institution’s legal existence. 
According to the charter, the college was to be guided by the chancellorship of the 
emperor and governed by a board of his own choosing (Wagaw 1979 &1990, Habtamu 
2003, Ahmed 2006). In the late 1950’s, the college was complimented by the 
establishment of other handful independent institutions in and around the major urban 
settlements. In about a decade time, all the HEIs in the country were pooled together to 
form a national university system named after the emperor - Haile Silasie I University 
(HSIU) (AAU 2011, Wagaw 1979).  
In the next few years, HSIU went through a lot of expansion and development processes 
until the demise of the emperor. During this time, a number of additional faculties were 
founded and continuing education division for evening program was added to the regular 
program. In 1974, following the overthrowing of the emperor, the university had to be 
once again renamed to Addis Ababa University (AAU) (Wagaw 1979). Except some 
minor changes, the years 1974-1977 did not mark visible change in the university mainly 
due to the continued civil war and political unrest. In 1977, the military government 
transferred the responsibility of Board of Governors to central authority called the 
Commission for Higher Education (CHE). This eventually marked the ultimate annul of 
the university’s autonomy (Gemeda 2008).  However, it should be acknowledge that in 
spite the autonomy circumcision, AAU managed to expand and diversify its academic 
programmes during the times of CHE. This period also marked the beginning of graduate 
study at Masters Level in 1979 and PhD in 1987at the university (Ahmed 2006, Gemeda 
2008).  
Soon after the 1991 regime change, the university was able to regain its autonomy and 
healthy intellectual climate. However, the sprouting of row between the university’s 
community and the new government in the mid 1990’s led to a more systematic 
circumcision of the university’s institutional autonomy and academic freedom (Gemeda 
2008, Yimam 2008). In spite of this, since the late 1990’s the university achieved 
encouraging developments in program expansion, intake capacity, establishment of new 
campuses and so forth. In a related development, in the history of Ethiopian HE, the years 
since the late 1990’s mark an all-inclusive extraordinary transformation. This is a period 
in which decisive measures and efforts to strengthen, upgrade and broaden the country’s 
HEIs are undertaken. Consequently, the university’s colleges that are located in different 
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parts of the country were upgraded to full-fledged autonomous university in their own 
right. This eventually marked the demise of AAU’s decades old structure that stretched 
out to different parts of the country.   
More recently, as a case in all universities in the country, the university is undergoing 
fundamental reform. It launched the implementation phase of its BPR initiative in 2009. 
The implementation phase marked the culmination of three years of planning and 
preparation that was started in 2007 with the development of the university’s 5-year 
Strategic Plan. With this, the university’s internal arrangements were redesigned in such a 
way that its structures and processes are aligned to optimize its efficiency and 
effectiveness to pursue the vision to be ‘A pre-eminent African research university 
dedicated to excellence in teaching, critical inquiry, creativity and public action in an 
academic community that cultivates and celebrates diversity”.  
As it stands now, the university runs undergraduate academic programs in more than 70 
academic and professional areas. Most of its colleges, faculties and institutes offer 
graduate programs at Masters and PHD level. According to the statistical record on its 
website, graduate admissions have increased by 400% over the past few years with 129 
and 65 MSc and PHd programs respectively compared to 22 MSc and 5 PHd programs 20 
years ago. The current total enrollment is around 50,000 with graduate enrolment of 7,127 
students. According to AAU’s Registrar archives, over 200,000 students have graduated in 
different disciplines and levels from AAU during its 60 years of existence. In the year 
2011, the university graduated around 12,000 students, the highest in its history with 
graduate study program hitting more than 2000 for the first time (AAU 2011b).  
2.2.2 Mekele University 
Mekelle University is located in Mekele, the capital city of Tigray Region of Ethiopia, at a 
distance of 783 Kilometers north of the Ethiopian capital. It was established through the 
merger of Mekelle Business College and Mekelle University College in May 2000 in 
accordance with the decree of Government of Ethiopia Council of Ministers, Regulations 
No. 61/1999 of Article 3 (FDRE 1999a). Before the merger, the two colleges went through 
their own historical ascends and descends. 
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Mekelle University College (MUC) was incepted in 1993 as the Arid Zone Agricultural 
College after a series of voluminous relocations in different parts of the country. 
Originally, the college was intended to be located near Seleh Leha, in northwestern 
Tigray. However, for some reason, its establishment was reshuffled to Asmara University 
(found in present day Eritrea). After few years stay in Asmara, it was moved with Asmara 
University to Agarfa, Southern Ethiopia when the university was displaced by the then 
military government in 1990 due to the then political instability. When its hosting 
university relocated back to Asmara after a year spell at Agarfa, the Arid Zone 
Agricultural Faculty moved temporarily to another university called Haromaya (the then 
Alemaya). Then again, in 1993 it was relocated, this time to settle permanently in Mekele 
as the College of Dryland Agriculture and Natural Resources Management. With all the 
ups and downs, the college commenced its teaching undertaking by enrolling 42 students 
in three degree programs in 1993. In few years time, the college’s academic scope was 
broadened by the establishment of the Faculty of Science, Technology, and Law (MU 
2011). As opposed to MUC, Mekelle Business College has its legacy exclusively in 
Tigray Region. It was first founded as a school of Economics in 1987 by the then armed 
opposition junta (now incumbent) in one of the then liberated areas in Western Tigray – 
Dejena. Its core mission was to produce middle-level professionals who could assume the 
financial and administrative responsibilities of public offices in liberated areas during the 
armed struggle. Soon after the rise of EPRDF to power, the school was upgraded to a 
college level. It was then relocated to the city of Mekele (MU 2011).  
Mekele University is among the pioneer HEIs in Ethiopia in embarking the BPR initiative. 
It initiated the reform early in 2007. Hence, it was able to finalize the planning phase of 
the reform much earlier than other universities did. To test the fruit of the effort, it 
prepared an integrated implementation plan that include a wide variety of intervention 
projects ranging from introducing new organization structures, processes and 
infrastructures to revising curriculum and research policies. In 2008, step by step 
implementation of the reform from partial to full scale was commenced and was 
completed later in the mid 2009.  As it stands today, the university caters both 
undergraduate and post-graduate programs. After the implementation of BPR initiative, it 
reorganized its colleges in four campuses: Endayesus campus (Dry Land Agriculture and 
Natural Resources Management, Natural and Computational Sciences, Enginerineeg and 
computer sciences, and Paleoenvironment and Heritage Conservation), Adi Haki campus 
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(Law and Governance, Languages and Humanities, Business and Economics, Institute of 
Pedagogical Sciences), Aider campus (College of Health Sciences) and Kelamino campus 
(College of Veterinary Science). Through its School of Graduate Studies, it offers eleven 
postgraduate study programs. As of 2009/2010 academic year, the university hosted over 
22,000 student population (35% female) in regular, evening, summer and distance 
education programs with nearly 1200 and 1350 academic and support staff respectively 
(MU 2010).  
2.2.3 Hawassa University 
Hawassa University (formerly Debub University) is located in Hawassa, capital city of 
Southern Nations Nationalities, and People's Region of Ethiopia (SNNPR) at a distance of 
272 kms south of the national capital. Following the Council of Ministers Regulation No. 
62/1999, it was officially inaugurated on 25th of April 2000 by consolidating three 
colleges: Awassa College of Agriculture, Dilla College of Teachers Education and Health, 
and Wondo Genet College of Forestry and Natural Resources (FDRGE 1999b). At its 
inception, Hawassa College of Agriculture served as the nucleus of the university.  From 
2000 to 2006, it used to be referred to as Debub University. In 2006, Dilla College of 
Teachers Education and Health Science seceded from the University after it was upgraded 
to an autonomous university on its own right and with that, the university was renamed 
after its host city Hawassa. In a similar move, Wondo Genet College of Forestry and 
Natural Resources is expected to turn itself to a university college in the near future (HU 
2011).  
Soon after its establishment, the university undertook ambitious expansion projects both 
academically and organizationally. Thus, alongside improving the capacity of existing 
colleges, it embarked on huge expansion project with the establishment of the main 
campus at the periphery of the city in the early 2000’s.  Consequently, by the mid 2000’s, 
it was able to achieve remarkable success in enrollment and academic program expansion 
well beyond expectation.  In about 6 years time since its establishment, it was able to 
enroll nearly 15,000 students in more than 40 departments, which were organized under 3 
colleges and 8 faculties, compared to less than 3000 students during its inception. As a 
case with other universities in the country, the university has taken initiative to undertake 
BPR reform in 2008. With the completion of the reform plan; the university commenced 
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partial implementation in 2009. The following year, the new organization structure and 
working system was put fully operational. After the reform, the university’s colleges and 
faculties are reorganized into 4 institutes and 21 departments in four campuses; namely 
the Main Campus, College of Agriculture Campus, College of Health and Medical 
Sciences Campus, and Wondogenet College of Forestry and Natural Resources Campus.  
Currently, it offers both undergraduate and graduate programs. The school of Graduate 
study, which had 31 programs in 2009/10 academic year, is expected to raise its academic 
programs to 40 as of 2010/11 academic year. According to the enrolment for 2010/2011 
academic year, the university has more than 20,000 students in regular, evening, weekend, 
distance and summer programs. It has workforce composed of about 930 full time 
academic staff (13% female) and 1400 supportive staff (more than 45% female) (HU 
2010). 
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3 Analytical Framework 
This chapter presents the study’s analytical framework. It is divided into four parts. The 
first part presents the conceptual perspective that underpins the study’s assumptions and 
premises about the universities’ organizational responses to the BPR reform initiative. In 
doing so, it provides brief discussion on the two theoretical viewpoints, neo-institutional 
and resource dependency, on which the framework drew and then based on the 
organization-environment relationship embedded in the two perspectives; it describes how 
the universities are positioned in the Ethiopian BPR reform process. The second part 
provides discussion on the ambivalence that emanates from the nature of the 
implementation path followed in implementing the BPR reform. In line with this, 
conceptual foundation for divergent and convergent trend in decentralized approach to 
policy implementation is provided. The third part provides discussion on the repertoire of 
organizational response strategies the universities have in responding to the reform 
initiative. The final section of the chapter conceptualizes models of institutional 
governance and how they are to be operationalized in the next Analysis and Discussion 
chapter. 
3.1 Conceptualizing Ethiopian universities organizational response to the 
BPR reform 
Organizations are generally seen as open systems with interdependent parts working 
jointly towards common organizational goals (Gornitzka 1999:6, Katz & Khan 1966, Scott 
1998). This view of organizations is based on the assumption of entropy, the necessary 
dependence of any organization upon its environment (Katz & Khan 1966) and the 
reciprocal relationship and influences an organization has on its environment (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). In this organization-environment relationship, organizations are perceived 
as micro actors embedded in the larger macro-environment comprised of other 
organizations and institutions that exert various influences of economic, political and 
social nature. In the framework to be presented, this open system view is used as a basic 
point of departure in conceptualizing Ethiopian universities’ organizational response to 
the implementation of BPR reform. The framework draws on two theoretical viewpoints 
from organizational studies – neo-institutional and resource dependency approach.  
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Both neo-institutional and resource dependency perspectives share an open system’s basic 
assumption of environmental determinism as pivotal to organization actions but diverge 
from each other regarding the organizational capacity to react to changes in the 
environment (Gornitzka 1999:7, Gornitzka & Maassen 2000, Oliver 1991:146-150). 
Resource dependency theory begins with the assumption that organizations operate in an 
open space in which they not only depend on their environment for critical and scarce 
resources essential to their continued existence but also have control over resources 
needed by the environment. It thus explicates how organizations act strategically to make 
active choices to manage their dependencies on those parts of their environment that 
control critical resources. It thus focuses on structural adaptation in relation to 
dependencies on external environments, but is more explicit about an organization’s 
discretion within the context of environmental constraints (Gornitzka 1999:7-9, Gornitzka 
& Maassen 2000, Oliver 1991:146-151, Pfeffer & Salancik 1978).  
Neo-institutional approach in its part embodies how an organization’s behavior is shaped 
beyond individual volition by socio-cultural values of institutional logics prevailing in the 
environment. It emphasizes the essence of social and cultural aspects in the form of 
institutional rules, pressure and sanction in determining organizational structure, behavior 
and actions (Gornitzka 1999:7-9, Gornitzka & Maassen 2000, Oliver 1991:146-151, Scott 
2001, Zucker 1987). It presupposes organizations to operate in an environment dominated 
by rules, requirements, understandings and taken-for-granted assumptions about what 
constitute appropriate or acceptable organizational forms and behavior (Scott 2001, 
DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Organizations that match their internal structure, behavior and 
actions with requirements coming from their institutional environment get a return in the 
form of increased legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, Zucker 1987).  
Scholars suggested the complementarities of the two perspectives in relating 
environmental determinism to organizational response (for instance, Gornitzka 1999, 
Gornitzka & Maassen 2000, Huisman and Meek 1999, Jongbloed, Maassen & Neave 
1999, Oliver 1991). Central tenet of both perspectives is the assumption that 
organizational choice is limited by a variety of external pressures emanating from the 
collective and interconnected environment and thus, each organization’s survival depends 
on responsiveness to external expectations. Their divergent foci reside in their supposition 
of the organizational capacity to react to environmental pressure and how they do it 
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(Gornitzka 1999:7). Scott (1998) attributed their difference to the nature of the 
relationship organizations have with their environment. Treating technical and 
institutional issues separately, he identified two sets of environments with which 
organizations interact. The technical/task environment comprises the sources of inputs as 
well as the destinations for an organization’s output. Whereas institutional environment 
refers to the socially constructed normative worlds in which organizations operate. 
According to Scott, the presence of these distinct environments points to different linkage 
processes between an organization and its environment. Oliver (1997:700) put this linkage 
difference as follow:  
‘According to institutional theory, firms make normatively rational choices that are 
shaped by the social context of the firm, whereas the resource-based view suggests 
that firms make economically rational choices that are shaped by the economic 
context of the firm.’ 
In this study, the implementation of BPR in Ethiopian universities and the universities’ 
responses to the reform are conceptualized in light with this environment-organization 
relationship embedded in the two perspectives. As clarified in the previous chapter, this 
reform agenda is initiated by the government. The government operates both in the task 
and institutional environment. In the institutional environment, it operates by means of its 
governmental agencies, rules, laws and regulatory structures and mechanisms. This does 
not mean that it is the sole actor. It is considered as one of the major actors in the wider 
socio-cultural environment. In the task environment, it is the main stakeholder acting as a 
source for economic resources and a grand employer of graduates and an ultimate user of 
the universities’ services. Interpreting the two theoretical perspectives in the 
implementation of BPR in Ethiopian universities would thus mean that the outcome of the 
reform is conditioned by the extent to which the universities are subjected to pressures 
arising from environmental actors in general, the government in particular and the ability 
of individual institutions to respond to the exerted pressure. Even though the government 
in the Ethiopian context is the most important and dominant stakeholder pressing 
influence on the universities as is the case in the developing world in general, it does not 
mean that it exerts arbitrary pressure on all universities at the same level, neither are its 
influences linear in nature. Rather, the universities’ responses are conditioned by a 
multifaceted complex network of relationships and dynamic interactions the government 
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has with each individual university. In this study, each individual university is assumed as 
having different context and level of organizational capacity to cope with external 
influence.  
Indeed, the mechanism through which governmental influences are being exerted is of 
paramount importance in determining the government’s leverage to influence the 
universities’ actions. Hence, conceptualizing the universities organizational response 
requires a clear delineation of how the formal frameworks and structures for implementing 
the BPR are laid, how individual universities are positioned in the implementation 
process, and how the government coordinates the whole process. As elaborated elsewhere, 
contradictory to its long years’ top-down intervention tradition, the Ethiopian government 
followed a federative approach in implementing the reform in such a way that each 
individual institution has autonomy to conduct its own organizational reformation. 
Conceptualizing such orientation requires departing from the traditional top-down 
conception of implementation. Top-down conception is too narrow in its perspective to 
explain such process as it concentrates only on the flow of the process from the higher 
level to the lower (Enders et al. 2003, Gornitzka et al. 2005). It presumes change to be an 
outcome of central actors’ proactive action rather than an interactive and dynamic process 
that includes different levels and actors. This eventually makes it neglect initiatives 
coming from local implementing officials and street level bureaucrats. The same goes to 
the bottom-up perspective. Though it provides a more realistic understanding of 
implementation as it begins with the grass-root level, it too lacks the conceptual width to 
grasp reality as it is the reciprocal of the top-down’s hierarchical view (Enders et al 2007). 
Referring to this, Berman (1978) pointed to the presence of an artificial dichotomy 
between the two perspectives and hence, suggested the complimentary use of both. He 
argued that implementation is top-down to the extent that statute and regulation constrain 
the power of those below but also bottom-up to the extent that street-level actors have 
local discretion to limit hierarchical influence. Bearing this in mind, he posited that policy 
implementation occurs at two levels, macro and micro. At macro-implementation level, 
central actors dictate a policy decision; whereas at micro-implementation level, local 
actors and street-level bureaucrats develop and implement their version in response to the 
macro plans.  
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Figure 1 - Environmental pressure and organizational response 
 
 
 
This macro and micro actors’ conception goes hand in glove with neo-institutional and 
resource dependency’s environmental influence and organizational response. The macro 
perspective represents environmental influence and the micro perspective relates to 
organizational response. In line with this, in this study, I interpret the core actors in the 
implementation of the BPR reform in the Ethiopian HE system to be the government, its 
institutions and the vast array of regulatory, normative and socio-cultural influences it 
uses to coordinate the BPR implementation as macro level actors in the centre; and 
individual universities as relative autonomy to plan and implement their own system in 
response to the reform initiative as micro actors. The net result of the reform is thus 
conceived to rest neither with the micro actors – individual universities, nor with the 
macro actor – the government, but with the mutual adaptation process between the two.   
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3.2  Ambivalence in decentralized implementation 
As has already been discussed, the orientation followed in implementing BPR in 
Ethiopian universities is based on synthesized approach in which individual institutions 
are given autonomy to conduct their own organizational reformation. According to 
Kickert (1995), the main relevance of such approach in HE is that it departs away from the 
traditional idea of direct government intervention in favor of local discretion with the 
assumption that local actors with adequate awareness of a local situation would be able to 
effectively, efficiently and flexibly respond to the increasing variety in societal demands. 
Autonomy is believed to liberate institutions from the rigidities of central actors’ rational 
monitoring and thereby, help them better adapt to the dynamic of societal needs (Sanchez-
Ferrer 1997, VanVught 1989).  
 However, by its very nature, such approach is so decentralized that it gives local actors 
room to maneuver which in turn can lead to the proliferation of divergent trends. In the 
context of macro-micro actors, Berman (1978) accentuated the possibilities of divergent 
trends to take place to the extent local actors are given the mandate for discretion. He 
argued that when local actors have autonomy to dictate their own choice, central actors 
can influence them only indirectly. This eventually paves the way for variation in how 
individual actors at the micro level respond to the same national policy. Clark (2000 in 
Meek 2003) posited a similar argumentation. He stressed that though central actors 
announce policies, implementation in HE lies in the hands of university level actors, 
which have their own trajectories. Thus, even though it provides a mechanism to inculcate 
locally and institutionally important realities, as it is much decentralized, less hierarchical 
and less clear steering strategy than theoretically thought, the introduction of such 
approach in the practice of HE is evidenced to have resulted in divergent and partly 
contradictory trends (Maassen & Stensaker 2003).  
As opposed to this, Van Vught (1996 & 2009) argues that the adaptation processes 
universities pass through in one way or another would lead to homogenization through 
time as they react in response to more or less uniform environmental conditions. He 
argues that as universities try to adapt to the existence of and pressures by other 
organizations and forces in their environment, it leads to DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) 
constraining process of isomorphism.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) reasoned out that, 
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acting as master bridging process in the form of coercive, mimetic and normative forces; 
isomorphism shapes organizations facing the same set of environmental conditions to 
become more homogeneous and more similar in structure over time.  
Within the macro-micro actors’ framework drawn for this study, this would mean that the 
possibility of divergent or convergent trends depends on the balance between the forces 
driving towards the either end. Hence, the stronger the coordinating and steering 
mechanisms used by the government are in comparison to the reactive capacity of 
individual universities, the more similar the reform outcome will be and vice-versa. 
3.3 Organizational strategies to deal with environmental pressure 
As explored in the above discussion, the conceptual framework mapped by the neo-
institutional and dependency perspectives stressed that organizational responses are 
heavily shaped by pressures emanating from the institutional and task environment. This 
does not mean that organizations blindly conform to environmental pressures. Instead, 
they are active players that can proactively respond in different ways. Oliver (1991) 
considers organizations as capable of making strategic choices within the context of 
constraints imposed by their environment. In HE, institutional responses and structural 
compliance to policy expectation have been contended to be conditioned by the normative 
match of the intended reform with the academic traditions (Gornitzka 1999:10).  
Empirical evidence reveals how reform endeavors lacking this are handicapped in the 
bottom heavy HE structure (see Birnbaum 2001, Musselin 2005). Becher and Kogan (1980 
in Clark 1983:183) attribute this to the fact that academic cultures, values and beliefs for 
the most part evolve to protect the legitimate interests of researchers and teachers. Thus, 
any move including those generated from within the university itself could fail if they are 
meant to compromise the interests of researchers and teachers. This would mean that the 
more the elements of the reform departed from an individual university’s or sector’s 
tradition, the higher the level of resistance to change will be. 
However, the leverage a university has depends on the maturity of the university as an 
establishment. Clark (1983:183) put it as follows: 
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At the outset, a system has little culture of its own to guide interaction and change. But as it 
develops, it builds its own source of continuity and change. It grows larger and becomes 
complex, it acquires structure of work,  belief and authority … Mature system compared to 
the emerging one is like the adult compared to the new born or young child, it has greater 
stability of character and hence of response, it is much less dependent than when recently 
emerged from the womb (the society). Thus, developed systems will be full of constraints 
upon change.   
This points to the assumption that the less mature an organization as a system is, the 
higher the chances of conformity will be. In line with this contention, in this study it is 
assumed that the less mature a university as an establishment is, the higher is its exposure 
to environmental influence (in our case in particular governmental influences). And, the 
higher the exposure to governmental sphere of influence is, the more likely a university 
will surrender to the government’s functional expectation and if this same trend of 
dependency prevails across the system, the more similar the universities’ responses will 
be as they respond to comply to the same central actor’s expectation and vice versa.  
Table 1 - Oliver’s (1991) typology of strategic response 
Strategy Tactic Examples 
Acquiescence Habit Following invisible, taken-for-granted norms   
 Imitate  Mimicking institutional models 
 Comply  Obeying rules and accepting norms  
Compromise  Balance Balancing the expectations of multiple constituents  
 Pacify  Placating and accommodating institutional elements  
 Bargain  Negotiating with institutional stakeholders  
Avoid  Conceal  Disguising nonconformity  
 Buffer  Loosening institutional attachments  
 Escape Changing goals, activities, or domains  
Defy  Dismiss  Ignoring explicit norms and values  
 Challenge  Contesting rules and requirements  
 Attack  Assaulting the sources of institutional pressure  
Manipulate  Co-opt  Importing influential constituents  
 Influence  Shaping values and criteria  
 Control  Dominating institutional constituents and processes 
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Under the frame of this assumption, Oliver’s (1991:152-159) typology of organizations’ 
strategic response to environmental pressure provides sound frame of reference for 
analyzing and interpreting the response of Ethiopian universities to the BPR reform. 
Oliver outlined a typology consisting five categories of organizations’ strategic response 
to environmental pressure in ascending order ranging from the most passive to the most 
active, the more compliant to the more defiant and the more impotent to the more 
influential one depending on the combination of the antecedents leading to the reform and 
individual institution’s context (See Table 1). Each category is further subdivided into 
three types of behavior ranging from passive conformity to active resistance to 
institutional pressures. By combining these strategic responses with a range of antecedents 
i.e. why pressure is being exerted (cause), who is exerting pressure (constituent), what the 
pressures consist of (content), how and by what means they are exerted (control) and 
where they occur (context), she outlined a number of hypotheses regarding how individual 
organizations act in real terms with greater degree of resource reliance, soaring match in 
objectives, strong control mechanisms and a high degree of interconnectedness in the 
environment leading to less resistance and more conformity and vice versa (Oliver 
1991:159-171).  
The analysis and interpretation of the universities response to the reform initiative in this 
study bases on these Oliver’s category of organizational response to environmental 
pressure and her hypothesis regarding the actual response of an organization. However, 
interpreting the universities’ response under this typology requires delineating to what 
values and ideals the universities are expected to conform. In this regard, as it is drawn 
from the private sector, BPR’s basic values and ideals are embedded in the private 
sector’s managerialist ideals in which corporate discourse of accountability, efficiency, 
effectiveness, flexibility and responsiveness are institutionalized (see Davenport & Short 
1990, Hammers 1990, Hammers & Champy 1993). Hence, the universities’ organizational 
response should be seen in light with the extent their new structures match to the backdrop 
of these private sector’s organizational mottos and ethos.  
One cautionary issue that must be reminded here in the use of this typology to the 
Ethiopian case is contextual difference. As the Ethiopian context presents extremely 
controlled environment, it normally does not give individual institutions much room to 
actively maneuver their response especially when it comes to the most active and defiant 
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responses. Even then, as the change strategy followed by the government offer relative 
autonomy to the institutions, the universities response may take different form within the 
lower level responses. 
3.4 Conceptualizing Institutional Governance in HE - Towards an 
Interpretative Framework 
The discussion so far presents the conceptual perspectives that underpin the assumptions 
and premises about organizational responses to environmental pressure. However, having 
a framework for organizational response to environmental pressures is not enough to 
analyze the governance change in the universities. It requires delineation of analytical 
tools that can be used as a frame of reference in exploring the governance change within 
the universities. In line with this, in this section attempt is made to conceptualize 
institution level governance and thereby, provide interpretative archetypes that can be 
used in analyzing the governance change within the universities.  
Governance in its basic theme is a relational concept whose meaning depends on the point 
of departure, level of analysis and context in which it is described.  A variety of 
definitions ranging from rhetorical to substantial ones are found in the literature making a 
single unanimously comprehensive definition a difficult one (see Goedegebuure and 
Hayden 2007, Kitthananan 2006, Meek & Davies 2009, Rhodes 1996, Stoker 1998). In 
spite of this variation, a common element in conceptualizing it in HE is the notion of 
multifaceted web of interactions and relationships among bodies operating at different 
levels defining where a decision is made by whom, when and on what aspect (see Amaral, 
Jones & Karseth 2002, De Boer & File 2009, Goedegebuure & Hayden 2007, Maassen 
2003, Meek 2003). For instance, Toma (2007:58) referred to governance ‘as simple and as 
complicated as responding to the question- who make decision?’ In a similar inclination, 
Gallagher (2001 in Meek 2003:12) delineated it as the structure of relationships that 
authorize policies, plans & decisions; and account for their probity & responsiveness. 
Likewise, De Boer and File (2009:10), Marginson & Considine (2000:07) and Meek 
(2003:12) described it in the lenses of decision making and patterns of authority 
distribution.  
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HE governance can be labeled at two levels - institutional/internal and system 
coordination/external governance (De Boer and File 2009:10). System governance 
encompasses the vast array of macro level structures and relationships through which the 
regulatory framework and policies for tertiary education are developed, how money is 
allocated to institutions and how they are accountable for the way it is spent, as well as 
less formal structures and relationships which steer and influence behavior across the 
system. Whereas institutional governance refers to the structures and processes within 
individual institutions that establish responsibilities and authority, determines 
relationships between positions and thereby define the ways through which all parties in a 
university setting relate to each other (De Boer and File 2009, Maassen 2003, Santiago 
2008). The relationship between the two levels determines the characteristics of individual 
HEIs, how they relate to the whole system, the nature of academic work and more 
importantly the ways the HEIs are organized and governed. The central focus of this study 
rests at the institution level governance. Hence, hereafter the term institutional governance 
is used to refer to the structures and processes through which communities in a university 
interact with and influence each other in making decisions. 
Examining the restructuring of institutional governance in a university setting not only 
needs the conception of institutional governance but also analytical tools to systematically 
analyze how the core elements underlying institutional governance are integrated with 
each other. A systematic approach for examining the means of differentiation and 
integration in terms of how an individual HEI coheres; how it exercises authority; how it 
relates to internal members (such as students and staff); how decisions are made and how 
far it delegates responsibility for decisions is needed. According to (Olsen 2007), these 
issues vary according to the dominant idea of what a university is in a respective HE 
system - university as an institution and as an instrument. He described the two ideals as 
follow: 
The University can be seen as an organizational instrument for achieving predetermined 
preferences and interests. Then the issue is how the University can be organized and 
governed in order to achieve tasks and objectives in the most efficient way….The 
University can also be seen as an institution. An institution is a relatively enduring 
collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and 
resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively 
resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing 
external circumstances (Olsen 2007:)
Based on these ideas, he outlined four visions o
(see Figure 1). In the first two visions, the university is seen as instrument of internal 
actors and hence, its structures, operations and dynamics are assumed to be determined 
mainly by internal factors. Institutional autonomy and academic freedom are seen as two 
sides of the same coin with collegial dealings being the primary mechanism for decision
making. In the remaining two visions, university dynamics are conceived to be determ
by interests and demands emanating from the external environment. Institutional 
autonomy is thus circumscribed by the 
governmental actions and deliberations
agenda’ and by responsiveness 
system filled with competition 
2007:07-12). 
Figure 2 - Visions of university 
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order and integration in a university system come about from a particular perspective and 
thereby help understand the dynamics of governance from a specific point of view. In 
doing so, they inevitably obliterate the view from other dimensions. However, they should 
not be seen as mutually exclusive but in combination to one another.  The extent to which 
a specific form dominates in a given university setting varies according to national context 
in which the HEI under consideration operates (see Dill 2000, Clark 1983). According to 
Clark (1983), the context in which HEIs operates is dependent on where the national HE 
system under consideration is placed within the three-dimensional field of coordination 
constituted by academic oligarchy, state authority and the market.  Through his famous 
‘triangle of coordination’, Clark (1983) demonstrated how these three forces determine 
the way in which a HE system is coordinated. State authority refers to governmental 
deliberations to steer the decisions and actions of societal actors. Market forces refer to 
unregulated exchanges linking persons’ interest and parts together under competitive 
conditions. Academic oligarchy refers to the coordinating capacities of academic elites 
who work together to influence and guide decisions and actions in the respective national 
system. Using these three coordinating mechanisms, Clark constructed his triangle in 
which each location represents the combination of the three in different degree. In this 
triangular field of coordination, countries are evidenced to have developed different 
forms: a more market-like co-ordination (example: the USA), bureaucracy induced co-
ordination (example: the USSR and Sweden) and academic oligarchy dominated co-
ordination (examples Italy and UK) (Clark 1983:137-145).  
With this system level variation come the three modal types of university organization: 
the continental model (hierarchical), the United Kingdom model (collegial), and the 
United States model (managerial) (Amaral, Jones & Karseth 2002, Clark 1983, Dill 2000). 
The continental model embodies fundamental aspects of the bureaucratic mode of 
integration in which authority is shared by faculty guilds and state bureaucracy (Amaral, 
Jones & Karseth 2002). Academic policies such as the validation of courses and diplomas, 
the size of academic staff, the conditions of student admissions, and the formal structure 
of internal management and governance are standardized at the national level. This 
eventually eliminated the need for institutional level mechanisms to integrate academic 
matters. In institutions where such model dominates, the governance of academic work is 
coordinated and directed individually by the chair holding professors as part of their 
activity at the operating level units and collectively by a group of professors exercising 
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collegial rule at the institution level (Amaral, Jones & Karseth 2002, Clark 1983, Dill 
2000). Thus, when seen vertically, this model has placed authority at the bottom in guild 
forms and at the top in ministerial bureaucracy with weak authority at the institution level 
(Clark 1983). In contrast to the continental model’s view of HE governance, the UK 
model is premised on the belief that HE is too important to be left to the political whims 
of the nation state. It emphasized the importance of institutional autonomy and self-
government (Amaral, Jones & Karseth 2002). Hence, in a national system where this 
model dominates, universities are seen as separate corporations responsible for their own 
management, for admission of students, for curriculum, and for hiring academic staff (Dill 
2000). Power is thus shared between academic oligarchy and institutional administrators 
and trustees. Thus, when seen vertically, this mode places strong authority in the 
operating and institution level units with active institutional-level administration (Clark 
1983). The distinguishing characteristic of this model in comparison to the others is the 
essence of tradition, shared values, and collegial structures for integrating academic work, 
as well as the reliance on professional judgment as a means of resolving conflicts 
(Amaral, Jones & Karseth 2002, Clark 1983, Dill 2000). The US system embodies 
relatively distinctive perspective compared to the UK and continental model. Dill (2000) 
put it as follows:  
The absence of national standards on student admissions, faculty personnel policies, and 
course and degree policies, coupled with variations in policies across 50 state systems 
and a large private sector, creates a competitive system in which institutional-level 
academic administration is substantially stronger and better developed than in other 
countries.  
Thus, the dynamics of institutional governance in systems where this form dominates is 
highly overtaken by the application of rational business criteria to the work of 
universities, with a greater influence by external actors, increased attention to strategic 
management, greater emphasis on leadership and reduced emphasis on collective decision-
making being central to internal governance.  Decision-making processes are dominated 
by a small group of executives at the top of the decision-making structure that can respond 
in a timely manner to a dynamic and competitive environment (Amaral, Jones & Karseth 
2002, Dill 2000).  
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The latter part of last century’s experience in academe witnessed an ostensible move 
towards a managerial model as an organizational ideal though the extent to which it has 
been followed up in practice varies from country to country and institution to institution 
(see Amaral, Jones & Karseth 2002). A number of interrelated developments within the 
higher education sector and the broader environment can be identified as drivers 
underlying the change. After World War II, the coincidence of an unprecedented demand 
for HE, coupled with increased awareness of its vital importance for socio-economic 
development by governments, had dramatically transformed universities from elite to 
mass system (Castells 2001). Alongside this, tectonic stresses underpinning broader 
change forces emanating from macro-environmental forces such as globalization, IT 
revolution & the subsequent growing importance of knowledge in economy, polity & 
society had remarkably contributed to the decrease in social and political homogeneity 
among individuals, leading to an erosion of a collective identity (see Peters 2001, De Boer 
and Goedegebuure 2003, Maassen 2003, Vaira 2004, Teixeira et al 2004, Fullan 2009). 
All these challenged public funding and  provision of HE while undermining the 
capability of national governments to steer and coordinate society. This eventually 
brought a shift in political rhetoric in the western world towards market-oriented models 
regarding the provision and coordination of HE. It changed how HEIs are defined and 
understood, the role and relationship the institutions have with society, the nature of 
academic work and more importantly the ways they are funded, governed & steered (De 
Boer and Geodegebuure 2003). This shift in Clark’s (1983) triangle is revealed in the 
tendency of the state to step-back and allow decision-making by individual students, 
institutions and independent agencies in a market-like mechanism. The reflection of this 
shift in the organization and governance of individual HEIs is the trend towards more 
entrepreneurial and managerial patterns leading to the infusion of private sector ethos of 
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness (see De Boer and Goedegebuure 2003, 
Maassen 2003, Vaira 2004, Teixeira et al 2004, Fullan 2009, De Boer and File 2009).  
The organizational ideals, coordination mechanisms and trends discussed so far are from 
the perspective of developed countries. Applying these to the developing world requires 
careful consideration of contextual variation and contemporary rhetoric in the governance 
of HE in this part of the world. In reference to the first aspect, developing countries 
present a unique social, economical and political context completely different from their 
developed counterparts. In the first place, the socio-politics landscape of these countries is 
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deeply rooted in autocratic culture that made social, political and economic institutions 
functionally dependent on governmental deliberations. Likewise, these countries represent 
a scenario where market forces are not sufficiently evolved to coordinate the actions of 
entities, let alone in such quasi-public sector, even in private sectors. As is the case across 
all other sectors, the HE sector in these countries is known by extremely low internal 
efficiency (resource utilization as indicated by costs per graduates, drop-out rates, and 
study duration in comparison to the countries’ limited resource) and external efficiency 
(the relationship with the labor market) (see Neave and van Vught 1994, Cloete et al 2011). 
Hence, the conventional interplay between market forces and governmental regulation is 
unrealistic. Besides, HE is a recent phenomenon in these countries in general and African 
countries in particular. It is the outcome of a recent transplantation of HE models from the 
western world (see Altbach 2004, Mwiria 1992, Thompson 1977, Yusufu 1973). This has 
at least two implications on the interplay of the three coordinating forces. First, the 
sector’s recent origin would mean that there are no well-established academic supper-
barons who can influence the dynamics of the countries’ HE system. Second, the forced 
transplantation of colonial models, which are developed in a completely different social, 
political and economic context, created problems of structural adaptation (Neave and van 
Vught 1994). These factors coupled with the institutionalization of developmental 
university idea especially among African countries since the 1960’s resulted in 
authoritarian rule towards the governance of HE in these countries.  van Vught (1991:01) 
put it as follows: 
In developing countries the state control model of HE appears to be predominant 
… government heavily regulates and controls HEIs even in countries, where 
initially state supervising model was introduced, very often now governments 
appear to have instilled the state control model. 
Hence, in a system where the state acts as omniscient and omnipotent actor to collectively 
coordinate and influence the means of production, distribution, and exchange in the 
sector, the natural mode of coordination is bureaucracy with hierarchical form of 
organization being the dominant form in individual HEIs. The interpretation of the afore-
discussed organizational ideals of universities in these countries should capture this 
circumscribed contextual reality. 
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The emerging form of governance in the developing countries’ HEIs should not only be 
seen from the unique context of these countries but also the contemporary sectoral, 
national and global reform rhetoric and circumstances. Nationally, HE in developing 
countries is in crisis owing to more or less similar forces of massification and resource 
shortage (Neave and van Vught 1994). Globally, the governments of these countries are 
increasingly pushed by supra-national agencies like World Bank and IMF to conform their 
institutional and organizational structure to globally rationalized myths of market 
algorithm, minimalist state and corporate managerialism (see for e.g. Vaira 2004, Maassen 
2003:31, Torres and Schugurensky 2002). This by itself presents a unique reality in these 
countries’ reform rhetoric. Developing countries’ governments are sandwiched between 
internal crisis and external pressure. Hence, to provide an insightful description on the 
emerging pattern of governance in these countries’ HE, not only consideration of endemic 
contextual settings and inherent nature of governments but also the driving force behind 
reforms in these countries is needed. 
Putting aside the contextual considerations, operationalizing the organizational ideals as 
analytical tool requires two conditions. Firstly, delineation of indicators is needed. As 
they convey a general impression that provides a broad indication of the state of reality on 
the ground, indicators help to systematically uncover which form/mode prevails in a 
respective university’s organizational setting. In this regard, a set of indicators as 
presented in Table 1 is formulated. Second is the resolution of how to recognize and 
interpret a dominant pattern in those indicators. In setting up a framework for analysis, 
Greenwood and Hinings (1993:1055) suggest the use of an interpretive scheme. For them, 
the starting point for identifying a dominant pattern is having an interpretive scheme 
synthesized from existing forms. In line with this, an interpretive scheme that describes 
the typical characteristic of the indicators in each of the organizational models – 
hierarchical, collegial and managerial/business oriented is provided in the table. It should 
be noted that the general characteristics pointed for each indicator under each model are 
not mutually exclusive. They can be noticed alongside each other in a given institution but 
the dominance of one form over the other might be noticed depending on the prevailing 
integration mode shaping the whole dynamics. 
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Table 2 - Description of indicators to the themes of institutional governance 
Indicators Hierarchical Model Collegial Model Business Enterprise Model 
Nature of 
structures 
Hierarchical - standard 
across all units 
 
Lateral- modestly 
standard across all units 
Pluralistic –  different from unit to 
unit according to changing 
circumstances and customers 
exigencies 
Power 
distribution 
Centralized at the 
apex of the system in 
the hands of 
governmental 
bureaucrats 
Decentralized; 
distributed among 
faculty 
Centralized; in the hands of 
institutional leaders and 
executive position holders in the 
hierarchy 
Autonomy of 
internal 
units 
Low High Differ depending on changing 
circumstances and suitability to 
meet customers exigencies 
Interaction 
pattern in 
decision 
making 
Hierarchically rational 
process 
Individual bureaucrat 
centered 
Collegial process 
 
Collective group based 
 
Economically rational process 
 
Individual manager centered 
 
Level of 
Staff 
Participation 
Low staff participation High staff participation Relatively modest participation 
Accrued 
leadership 
Autocratic Participatory, 
representative & 
transformational 
Managerial 
Recruitment 
and selection 
practices 
Appointment by 
bureaucracy 
By election for rotating 
term 
Merit based appointment 
Performance 
appraisal 
Dominated by 
hierarchical dealings 
Dominated by peer based 
collective evaluation 
Dominated by leader’s judgment 
Coordination 
and control 
By hierarchy General norms and 
standards 
Internal competition and economic 
relevance 
 
In general, the prevailing pattern of the universities’ organizational functioning is 
assumed to be a function of a dominant form among the three forces of integration: 
bureaucracy, clan and markets. Hence, the interpretative scheme outlined above dishes up 
as a baseline to recognize the dominant patterns embedded in the dynamics of the 
universities organizational functioning. After identifying the dominant patterns, the 
40 
 
question would be how to interpret the extent to which governance in Ethiopian HEIs is 
changed and to where the change is leading. In view of this, Olsen’s (2007) visions of 
university organization provide insightful analytical tools to relate the Ethiopian 
universities emerging governance dynamics to external stakeholders in general, 
government in particular. It helps to interpret the universities’ new arrangement as a 
function of governmental BPR reform within the frame of the analytical framework drawn 
from neo-institutional and resource dependency perspective.  
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4 Analysis and Discussion 
This section provides analysis of the universities’ institutional governance as defined by 
the formal structures and empirical functioning of these structures as perceived by 
sampled respondents from the three targeted universities. It is divided into four main 
sections. First, it begins with the analysis of institutional governance before the BPR 
initiative. In the second section, it portrays how the state of affairs is transformed after the 
reform. This section is further categorized into five portions – governance arrangement at 
institution level, governance arrangement at academic unit level, autonomy and patterns of 
power distribution in academic units, staff participation in institutional management and 
decision making processes and status of change in the universities. In the final two 
sections, discussion on the universities organizational response and the emerging mode of 
governance is given.  
4.1  Institutional governance in Ethiopian HEIs before BPR  reform 
Before the BPR initiative, the framework for institutional governance in Ethiopian 
universities was defined by the 2003 proclamation, which drew on the sector’s 50 years 
tradition. Thus, comprehending the organizational make up as prescribed by the 2003 
proclamation requires a review of the organizational structure of the country’s universities 
preceding that proclamation. Prior to the 2003 proclamation, the sector used to be 
formally governed by the 1977 proclamation. However, the 1977 proclamation itself did 
not contain a specific deliberation as to how an individual university was supposed to be 
organized. Rather, the internal governance and organizational make up of HEIs in 
Ethiopia was heavily influenced by the tradition of the country’s oldest institution, Addis 
Ababa University (AAU) as many of the country’s HEIs were the outgrowth of this 
university. Hence, understanding the organization of HEIs in Ethiopia should begin with 
groping the ideals embodied in AAU’s tradition. 
In this regard, while other African countries were wedded to the systems of their colonial 
masters, owing to its independence heritage Ethiopia was thought to have the opportunity 
to choose the kind of HE system that would suit its needs. However, this freedom of 
choice was largely negated by the influence of American aid money and the American 
42 
administrators this money brought to AAU in those initial years. 
though it drew its organizational experience from the wider international practice, in 
essence, AAU was more influenced 
continental European or UK models (see 
Figure 2, like US universities, AAU
authority vested in the apex of the structure in the form of institutional trusteeship and 
administration. At the top of the structure wer
of the university and senate of the university we
which consisted of the university’s 
be appointed by the then emperor, was designated as the highest decision making 
(see Ahmed 2006, Gemeda 2008 
Figure 3 - Institutional level Organizational Structure of Haile Selassie I University
According to this structure, the internal governance of the university had three academic 
levels - institutional, college/faculty and department level. The highest internal governing 
body next to the board at institution level wa
responsibility of managing the university. It wa
president along with the two vice presidents, faculty and college deans, staff and student 
representatives, students’ dean, the university registrar and a cross section of 
representatives from selected mass organizatio
chaired by the university’s president. Under the senate, the president along with the two 
vice presidents would form a committee called senate e
had the responsibility of managing
the senate. The sphere of responsibility under this hierarchy divided into two wings 
academic and administrative. Each of the two wings 
with the university president being the ultimate chief exec
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vs academic commission and department head vs department council. Although the 
university was run by presidents and vice-presidents appointed by the government, the 
highest decision making power in the universities vested in the university’s senate. Down 
to the hierarchy at colleges/faculty and department level, the units were deemed to be 
relatively autonomous in their academic decision with the collegial based academic 
commission (AC) and department commission (DC) being the highest decision making 
body respectively. 
Though there could be minor differences from institution to institution, the overall 
organizational structure of the universities was somewhat similar to this generic model 
(see UNESCO 1988 and Wagaw 1990). Each of the country’s HEIs had similar structures 
built on this predominantly collegial structure. Even the 1977 proclamation did not change 
any of this make up except from superseding university governing board whose function 
was supplanted by Commission for Higher Education (CHE) (see HEP 1977). More 
recently, with the ratification of the new higher education proclamation in 2003, an 
attempt to formally address as to how the universities should be structured was made. 
However, as is the case with its predecessor, the proclamation did not bring considerable 
change apart from resurrecting university board. In line with this, the universities’ 
management and administration was once again set to be carried out in the name of an 
independent board as free standing institution (see HEP 2003, Section Three for detail).  
All in all, the formal structure of the universities before BPR drew on predominantly 
collegial arrangements that emphasized the importance of collective decision-making. 
Though institutions of governance at each level were accountable to those organized at the 
next higher level, the heart of decision making at each level was lying in the lateral 
academic councils i.e. senate, academic commission and department councils. Each of 
these bodies was positioned and connected to the executives at its respective level, i.e. 
president, deans and department heads, in such a way that they not only make decisions 
but also check executives’ accountability. The role of academic executives such as 
president, deans and department heads was to execute the collective decisions made by the 
respective academic council. Given all this delineation, the formal framework of 
institutional governance in Ethiopian universities before BPR can be considered as leaning 
more to collective leadership ideals than leadership by executive fiat. Interpretation of this 
arrangement by using Olsen’s (2007) v
institutions too much expletive appearance as blend of self
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placement, and financial decisions is still evident (see Assefa 2008, Gemeda 2008, HESO 
2004, Mehari 2010, Semela 2008). The following excerption from Mekele University BPR 
team report on Academic Core Process Reengineering is an excellent illustration of the 
state of affairs.   
The current situation of Mekelle University is found to be painful. Lack of shared vision 
being the major cause for the pain, it has large number and variety of manifestations. As 
the team sees, the university does not have autonomy in decision making like curriculum, 
student enrollment, budget administration, and salary adjustment, which means the top 
managers have no full ownership of the University and they focus on routines of the 
system instead of working on strategic ones. (MU 2008a: 15)  
The glimpse of this officious culture is also reflected even in those matters which are 
normally left to the universities’ discretion. The extreme autocratic culture by the central 
government is evidenced to weaken the collective decision making process within the 
universities’ internal academic units leading to localized authoritarianism (see AAU 2011, 
HU 2008, MU 2008a). The following excerption from AAU’s document for reform on 
academic governance is a good description of the situation at hand. 
Partly due to external influence and partly due to internal failures, university 
governance increasingly came to give primacy to control, expediency, and quick results 
over institutional work and participatory decision-making. One consequence of this 
state of affairs has been the over-centralization of the academic structure in general and 
the steady growth of the executives’ power in particular. From the Senate and its 
standing committees all the way down to department/faculty assemblies and their 
committees, the bodies and organs through which faculty members participated and 
influenced academic decision-making have gradually been losing their influence, if not 
their form. The centralization of academic administration at the University level 
appears to have also encouraged a tendency towards centralization of decision-making 
in the academic units as well, so that, at least in some units, deans and department 
chairs came to regard their offices as dominions of power from where they could make 
decisions willfully and at times whimsically (AAU 2011:03). 
The drift of power in favor of academic leaders and the subsequent tendency towards 
centralization of decision-making in the academic units not only affected the collective 
decision-making process but also the level of staff
the universities was reported to have been continually declining owing to the incessant 
deterioration in the universities work environment. In all the three universities’ 
preliminary assessment, a visible decline in the motivation of the facul
part in academic governance wa
AAU 2011, HU 2008, MU 2008). 
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practical experience is manifested by the description of university as predominantly top-
down system dominated by hierarchical control. 
4.2   Institutional governance in Ethiopian HEIs after BPR reform 
4.2.1 Governance Arrangement at Institution Level 
A preliminary comparison of the universities’ new organizational structure may divulge 
how similar the form, composition and responsibility of the new institution level 
governing bodies is across the universities. This, however, may give a deceptive notion of 
the universities’ organizational response to the BPR initiative. As each university tried to 
make its organization robust, individually each came up with a structure different from 
one another in different aspects. Some universities opt to instill new governing bodies 
alongside the traditional senate while others propose a change in the composition and duty 
of already existing bodies and positions. For instance, in terms of composition, the initial 
generic structure of Mekele University had provision to include representatives of the 
university community alongside external stakeholders in the University’s board (see MU 
2008a). This, however, is not the case with respect to Addis Ababa University and 
Hawassa University both of which designate members of their University Board to be 
exclusively drawn from external stakeholders (AAU 2009, HU 2008a). In the same way, 
the internal governing bodies and structures showed notable differences. In this regard, 
the structure proposed by AAU puts a diversified set of decision-making arrangements, 
which involve both a selective regeneration of existing structures and a creative 
adaptation of new bodies, e.g. proposition of new advisory bodies alongside senate at 
university level (see AAU 2011 for detail). Whereas in Hawassa University and Mekele 
University, renovating of existing structures has been the trend (see HU 2008b &2008c, 
MU 2008b & 2008c).  
Nevertheless, these institutional differences have been concealed by the provisions of the 
recently revised legislation. After reviewing the preliminary arrangement proposed by 
individual universities, the government has revisited the legal framework in 2009 under 
the pretext of making the legal framework compatible to the ideals embodied in the BPR 
(See HEP 2009:4976 for detailed view). Following the statutory revision, the divergence 
trend evidenced in the universities
them modified their arrangement in accordance with the provisions of the new legislation. 
Owing to this, conceptualizing the universities
distinct the revised legislation is from the previous one. 
The difference between the 2009 proclamation and the 2003 proclamation can be seen in 
terms of orientation and content. In reference to orientation, the new framework becomes 
more general as one moves from 
levels. In the new framework, detailed provisions are provided only to institution level 
governing bodies with particulars for medium and lower levels left to be decided by the 
individual institutions (see HEP 2009, Part Three). With this, the new proclamation gave 
university incumbents more autonomy to reorganize their respective university’s internal 
structure except those institution level bodies which are precisely defined by the law. As 
opposed to this, the 2003 proclamation ha
2003, Part Three). In terms of content, in the 2003 proclamation, the arrangement
governing bodies at each level were stipulated in such a way that they would be 
compatible to representative and collective leadership ideals. In line with this, the 
governance structures at all levels were articulated in such a way that all constituents in 
the university community would have a voice. Nevertheless, in the 2009 proclamation, as 
evidenced by the tilting of power to executives over the 
apparent deliberation to move away from representative and collective leadership to 
powerful executive leadership is evidenced (See HEP 2009, Part Three and HEP 2003 Part 
Three for detail). The following figure shows the universities new institution level 
arrangement as defined by the new statutory. 
Figure 7 - Prototype structure of institution level organization of a university after BPR
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As can be seen from the figure, the new arrangement involves not only rejuvenation of 
existing bodies but also a creation of new ones. In line with this, the composition, power 
and duty of existing decision making bodies have been transformed considerably. In 
addition to this, new governing bodies in the form of university council and managing 
councils have been set up alongside the senate. Hence, unlike the previous arrangement in 
which institution level governance is dominated by a horizontal interaction between 
university president and senate, university level governance is now conditioned by 
multifaceted complex hierarchical and horizontal network of interactions and relationships 
among a set of bodies and positions.  
The University Board, as is the case with the previous arrangement, is designated as the 
ultimate supreme governing body of a university. Article 45, sub-article 1 of the 2009 
proclamation delineates the board to consist of a university president as non-voting 
member and seven voting members drawn from external stakeholders. The board is 
accountable to the Ministry of Education. Sub-article 2 of the same article articulates how 
members of the board are drawn. In this regard, the Ministry of Education is entitled to 
appoint the board chairperson and three additional voting members whereas the university 
president in consultation with the university council and senate nominates the remaining 
three voting members of the board. In line with this, even though there has been no 
significant change in terms of the board’s duty, the universities are now provided with the 
opportunity to participate in selecting members of the board. However, majority of the 
interviewees doubted the practicability of this provision as no indication of putting it into 
effect has been evidenced so far. A typical interview response from AAU puts it as 
follows  
What is laid by the statutory is a matter of formality. In real terms, in selecting candidates for 
board, I don’t think the university can exercise its right in its own way. I never heard of such a 
thing. Even if there is such a thing, as practical experience tells, the university’s president will 
normally consult the ministry of education before he designates any candidates for the board 
room and then, for the sake of formality; the case can be brought to the senate which often times 
opts to unanimously rectify such governmentally ready-made issues without making reasonable 
discussion. That is how things of such nature are usually decided in our university… (Interviewee 
1, AAU). 
In a similar inclination, another higher official from HU stressed the essence to work in 
consultation with the central government. Though he does not mention government’s 
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interference as hindrance to the university’s autonomy, the presence of the influence can 
be felt from his words. He explained as follow 
Yes the new provision provides us with the chance to have a say on board members but we have 
not yet practiced it as we needed time to prepare ourselves for its implementation. However, in 
the near future, perhaps in the coming few months, we will exercise our right. In doing so, the 
university management will consult not only the university senate but also the concerned ministry 
office. Even though the university is not obliged to consult with the government, having such 
harmonious relation is important as the lion share of our budget comes from the government 
(Interviewee 1, HU) 
Contrary to this stand, a majority of interviewees have reservations with respect to the 
government’s potential interference in choosing board members. The following response 
is typical one among those lined up in this category. 
Members of the board who are assigned through government dictated way are most of the time 
chosen not because they have sufficient professional experience but they are suitable to the 
government. As a matter of fact, as past experience tells, most of them do not have the relevant 
educational background and practical experience. (Interviewee 3, AAU) 
Indeed, this problem in selecting board members with relevant backgrounds is evidenced 
to have existed in the deeds of the government before the BPR reform (see HESO 2004).  
In 2004, a study conducted by Higher Education System Overhaul team composed of HEIs 
leaders indicated how the universities’ boardrooms were constrained regarding members’ 
capacity. If the status quo goes on this way (at the moment, there is no indication that it 
might change), it pinpoints the continuity of the trend. 
As far as senate is concerned, its composition and duty have been transformed 
significantly though not radically. As opposed to the previous statute, where senate 
membership is assumed by academic officers as ex-officio members, the new provision 
designates the majority of senate members to constitute of faculty members. However, 
such members of the senate are to be appointed by the respective university president 
(Article 50, Sub-article 2, HEP 2009:5014). In terms of power, in the previous structure, 
senate had the authority to collectively assume the respective university’s leadership 
through its executive body led by the president. However, in the new structure its position 
as supreme internal body has been substantially undermined as much of the formal 
authority is tilted to a university president, who is obliged to seek the senate’s decision 
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only on major academic matters. Even then, the senate is still defined as supreme 
legislative body within a university’s academic wing.  
In addition to senate, the new provision designates the establishment of new institution 
level bodies in the form of university council and managing council. Both these bodies 
have an advisory role to the president on issues that require collective examination. As is 
the case with the senate, both are chaired by the president. The first is composed of 
members drawn from a wide variety of officers, academic staff and student representatives 
with a mandate to advise the president on academic issues. The latter consists of vice 
presidents and other central officers as an advisory body to the president on major 
administrative matters that require collective examination. It also serves as a forum for 
monitoring, coordinating, and evaluating institutional operations. Below the presidentship 
position, at central university management level, a number of vice and associate 
presidentships with a number of directorate offices are formed in place of the two vice-
presidentship positions in the previous system. This is found to take different forms from 
university to university.  
In general, in terms of power distribution, senate is drawn to have more of a legislative 
role with restricted regulatory power whereas the other institution level bodies, i.e. 
university and managing council, are designated to have an advisory role. With this, the 
former horizontally encapsulated structure is now dominated by hierarchical relationships 
in which institution level bodies such as managing council and university council are 
hierarchically accountable to the president. Even University Senate which is not 
accountable to the president is now pushed to the periphery in terms of power attributed to 
it. The interaction pattern within each of these governing bodies as delineated by the 
legislation of the respective universities is deemed to be collective and participatory. 
Nonetheless, a university president is the most powerful member in all the three bodies as 
s/he has a casting vote in case of a tie in addition to her/his chairmanship mandate and 
her/his individual discretion to decide on whom to select for membership to these bodies 
from among university faculty (See HEP 2009, Section Three).  
The strengthening of executives’ power in general and the university president in 
particular is viewed grudgingly by some of the interviewees. In their opinion, even though 
the move to empower academic leaders is constructive as it enables institutions to cope 
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with the slow collegial processes, the sloping of too much power in favor of university 
president is feared to result in officious culture in place ofcollective decision making 
process. The following interview response marks a good concern in this regard. 
I don’t understand the rationale why university president is given the dominion of choosing 
majority of senate members. This may transplant a potential incongruity that may endanger the 
participatory and collective institutional work within the senate. Through time, presidents may 
tend to use their right as a power base to avoid challenges from members of senate by instigating 
only those academics that they can easily manipulate.  (Interviewee 1, AAU). 
Table 2 - Opinion of academic staff with respect to responsiveness, participatory and 
flexibility of institutional level governance in their university’s new system in comparison to 
the previous system 
Governance Dimension Name of Institution Combined 
average  
Chi-square 
value AAU HU MU 
Participatory Mean 2.79 2.28 2.24 2.41 0.07 
N 24 29 29 82 
Responsiveness Mean 2.42 2.10 2.28 2.26 0.405 
N 24 29 29 82 
Flexibility Mean 2.38 2.03 2.07 2.15 0.497 
N 24 29 29 82 
 
Note – Academic staff from the three universities were asked to appraise how participatory, responsive and 
flexible their respective university’s institution level governance is based on a five point scale that 
runs from very bad (1) to very good (5). The figures in columns 3-5 are average scores per university 
and the 6th column shows combined average value for all the three universities. Average score of < 
2.5 is interpreted as dissatisfaction and > 3.5 as satisfaction. A score between 2.5 and 3.5 is 
interpreted as neutral. Interpretation of the above figures with this scheme reveals how discontented 
the staffs are in relation to the respective dimensions. However, incisive examination of the figures 
for each individual institution shows that there is a slight difference in between AAU and the other 
two universities as AAU’s figures lean positively in relative terms. Hence, to determine whether or 
not this pattern is statistically significant, Pearson Chi-square test at 0.01 level accompanied by 
cross-tabulation analysis is made between the independent variable, university, and the respective 
dimensions (See Appendix A-1). In order to reduce the number of responses having less than 5 cell 
count, the five point scale response label is re-grouped into a three point scale that runs from 
Dissatisfied to Satisfied.  The Chi-square value computed, as shown in the 7th column of the table, 
are far greater than the reliability 0.01 level. This indicates that the aforementioned difference does 
not reflect a statistically significant pattern. Therefore, the initial interpretation made by the 
descriptive analysis can safely be assumed. 
Though they retreat to speculate on the situation, when asked directly, most of the 
interviewees avowed their concern regarding the potential risk in the strengthening of a 
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president’s power. Correspondingly similar concern is reflected in the response of 
sampled academic staff majority of whom rated the institution level governance and 
management process of their respective university as less participatory, less responsive 
and less flexible (see Table 3 and its description). Indeed, as actors with higher influence 
usually opt to exercise their power whenever deemed necessary, the tilting of power in 
favor of a university president can have implications for the decision-making process of 
the governing bodies. As opposed to this, a few interviewees explained the essence of 
having greater power to executives to curb up potential draw backs of the sluggish 
collegial processes. In this regard, even those interviewees who stated their frustration did 
not deny the ill effects of participatory governance, especially the delay in making 
decision.  
All in all, as evidenced by the deliberations of the formal provisions, it can be said that 
the previous arrangement that was constructed on the ideals of collective decision making 
is no longer presumed to be the dominant one. The trend reveals how institutional 
decision-making is positioned in a way that gives university executives managerial edge 
over collective academic bodies though the latter ones are still delineated to have a role. 
This divulges the underlying deliberations towards powerful executive leadership in place 
of the collective leadership ideals that were embodied in the previous system. Likewise, 
the empirical functioning of the system as perceived by academic staff and academic 
leaders points to the inclination towards strong executive fiat though the practicability of 
some aspects is questioned. 
4.2.2 Governance Arrangement at Academic Unit Level 
As has been elaborated in the previous section, the arrangement introduced by the 2009 
legal framework becomes more specific as one moves from the lower levels to the apex of 
a university structure. Detailed provisions are provided only to institution level governing 
bodies with particulars for medium and lower levels left to be decided by the individual 
institutions’ incumbents (see HEP 2009, Part Three). With this, it can be said that the 
universities were practically allowed to experiment with their own structure not at the 
whole hierarchy but at medium and lower levels. Owing to this, a facade view of the 
universities’ institution level structure makes their structure resemble each other’s. 
However, a thorough examination of the structures down in the hierarchy is needed to 
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grasp the whole picture as individual HEIs may differ in the way they organize their 
academic units, the scope of decision-making power they allow their units to enjoy and 
the relative distribution of power between executives and the respective governing bodies 
down in the hierarchy. 
In this regard, as each individual university tried to come up with arrangements that are 
workable and meaningful to its context, the downward hierarchical line up in the targeted 
universities is found to be ambivalent in a sense that in some aspects it shows moderately 
dissimilar structures. In the case of AAU, the university’s academic administration below 
the institution level is designated to have three hierarchical levels: department, school and 
college (AAU 2011). Hawassa University in its turn opted for experimenting with a school 
structure for all of its academic units with nominal colleges in between schools and 
university level management (HU 2008c). In the case of Mekele, the downward hierarchy 
below the institution level did not witness a far reaching change. As is a case with the 
structure before the BPR reform, the university is formed by a federation of internally 
autonomous colleges followed by schools/departments (MU 2008a, 2008b & 2008c).  
In a similar leaning, the internal organization of equivalent academic units evidenced 
slight variation across the three universities. As has been elucidated in the previous 
section, organization of academic units such as college, faculty and department in the 
former system was based on ideals drawn from representative and collective leadership. In 
the new arrangement, this typical organization has been transformed. At college level, 
though there is a moderate difference from university to university, the move in all the 
three universities marked a collective departure from the simple collegial based structure 
to a more complex structure in which domineering arrangements are put in place of the 
former collegial arrangements. For instance, in AAU the most important governing body 
for administrative issues at college level in place of the previous College Academic 
Commission (AC) is College Council which is a broad forum for holding consultations 
among the academic units grouped under the leadership of a college director. The council 
brings together not only academic leaders (Dept/Unit chairs, deans, directors, and 
assistant deans/directors) but also heads of administrative services, senior faculty 
members of the academic units and student representatives under a college (AAU 2011 & 
2010).  
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Figure 8 - Prototype of a College Organization in the new AAU organizational arrangement 
 
 
A slightly different trend has been evidenced in HU where college level bodies are pushed 
to the periphery as academic decision making power is devolved to the basic academic 
units - schools. Thus, except in those cases where the establishment of the units is 
exceptional, e.g. College of Agriculture, College of Health Science and Wondo Genet 
College of Forestry, practically there is no longer medium level management body 
standing between the university level governing bodies and the schools. Formally, 
colleges are delineated to serve as a forum for delivery of administrative services and 
galvanization of academic resources (HU 2008b & 2008c).  
In a different leaning, college is designated to have a more direct role in the academic 
decision making process in the case of MU. Most of the former faculties are now 
promoted to a college status. At the heart of college governance is a College Council, 
which is designated as the highest academic body next to the university senate. The 
college council mimics the roles of the former Academic Commission (AC). As its 
predecessor, it is chaired by a dean who holds office up on appointment by president. 
Membership to the council is designated by virtue of position held. In line with this, 
college dean, department heads, heads of college level research centers, leader of quality 
assurance team, one staff representative, one student representative, one senior staff and 
leader of college support team form the council’s membership by default (MU 2008a, 
2008b and 2008c). 
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Figure 9 - Prototype of a College Organization in the new HU organizational arrangement 
 
Figure 10 - Prototype of a College Organization in the new MU organizational arrangement 
 
All in all, college in the new system, with a minor exception in MU, is deemed to be an 
administrative forum for delivery of administrative services, development of interschool 
or interfaculty programs, and availability of academic programs for students across 
disciplines. Thus, unlike the previous system in which college used to have strong stake in 
academic and administrative decision making, the powers of colleges is now limited to 
administrative service areas that have been defined for it.  
The next level in the hierarchy is the operating level units where the basic academic 
undertakings reside. In this regard, academic units in the previous system used to be 
established based on disciplinary boundary with each disciplinary/academic program 
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having its own department units. Thus, the number of departments an institution 
accommodated was linearly related to the number of degree programs that institution 
offered with a creation of new degree programs leading to proliferation of new department 
in the respective faculty or college. For instance, before the BPR reform, AAU alone had 
more than 70 departments, while Mekele and Hawassa had 44 and 46 departments 
respectively (AAUb 2011, HU 2009 & MU 2011). As is evidenced in the universities’ 
preliminary assessment for the BPR initiative, this departmental organization is found to 
be structurally outdated (See AAU 2009b, HU 2008b & MU 2008c). The organization of 
academic units should be permissive of greater integration and harmonization of 
programs, greater interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary interactions, greater linkage of 
graduate and undergraduate programs and greater integration of teaching and research. It 
should also make movement of students and faculty across programs easier while avoiding 
excessive replication of departmental units and duplication of effort. In view of these 
points, the then disciplinary based system was reported to have acute shortcomings (AAU 
2009b, HU 2008b & MU 2008c). Accordingly, after the BPR initiative, most of the 
universities followed a trend of merging their basic academic units according to their 
similarities (See AAU 2011a &2010, HU 2008b & 2008c, MU 2008b & 2008c). As it 
overrides the ideals embodied in the previous proclamation, this trend eventually 
necessitated redefining the respective legal provision. In line with this, the law has been 
redressed in such a way that institutions can form basic academic units in cluster form 
rather than based on only a single discipline (see Article 18, sub-article 1 of HEP 
NO.659/2009: 4986).  With this, the conception of Academic Department as dignifying a 
single discipline and single academic program has become obsolete. Now they normally 
accommodate more than one study program.  
Complimentary to this orientation, departments are now promoted to school status. With 
this, their organization has become more complex as new bodies and positions are created 
to supplement this change. In this regard, the structure of academic units across the three 
universities marked relative difference between AAU and the other two universities. 
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Figure 11 - Prototype of a Faculty/School Organization in the new AAU organizational 
arrangement 
 
In the case of AAU, schools are designated to have three main governing bodies with 
differing level of authority in terms of legislative, regulative and executive role. At the 
center of a School is the School’s Staff Assembly with the highest legislative and 
regulative power. It is congregation of the entire staff of a school. It has the duty of 
formulating the respective school’s bylaws and policies on academic matters in 
consonance with the university legislation. Unlike university and college level bodies 
where the university president and college directors chair their respective bodies, School 
Assembly is headed by a chairperson the assembly appoints by collective agreement. The 
director of the respective school serves as the assembly’s secretary with enforcing the 
assembly’s decisions being his/her primary responsibility (AAU 2010 & 2011). The other 
most important governing body at this level is the Academic Commission (AC) that 
functions on behalf of a School’s Staff Assembly when the latter is not in session. It is 
composed of elected members from among School Assembly and chaired by chairperson 
appointed by the School Assembly with the respective dean/director serving as secretary 
of the AC. At the heart of a school administration is School’s Managing Council as a 
collection of executive officers with a mandate to advise the director of the school. It is 
composed of the chairs of Program Units, Heads of Centers and some selected academic 
staff and administrative officers of a school that the director chooses. It is analogous to 
the management council chaired by the President at central university level. It does not 
have decision-making powers but only to advise director of a school on matters that s/he 
wishes to counsel on (AAU 2010 & 2011).  
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The understructure of Mekele University (MU) and Hawassa University (HU) marks high 
degree of similarity. The degree of similarity casts question whether the institutions 
modeled their understructure after common prototype. 
been added. Each school is designated to have Academic Council functionally similar to 
the then Department Council. The council is composed of Team Leaders in a School with 
the chairmanship of appointed School Head. Unlike the previous simple and m
structure in which leader of an academic unit is the only executive force, the leadership 
position is now supplemented by additional support structures and positions deemed to be 
helpful for efficient and effective performance. In line with this,
envisions the creation of a number of academic teams such as Streams/Module Teams, 
Research Center and Teams, and Program Quality Assessment Team with each group 
having a mandate to manage activities in its respective area under the lead
department head. In line with this organization, unlike the previous tradition where all 
academic staffs of a given department are pooled together under one department head, 
academic staffs within a school are organized internally into a number o
Streams/Course/Module Teams 
leader who constitute membership for the respective School’s Academic Council. In line 
with this, academic decision making in a school begins in a given specialization team
those issues discussed on team level will be endorsed to the respective School’s Academic 
Council for decision (MU 2008b, MU 2008c, HU 2008b and HU 2008c). 
Figure 12 - Prototype of School structure in the new HU and MU organi
All in all, the organization of academic units in Ethiopian HEIs after BPR as revealed by 
the targeted universities’ new structure involved both selective regeneration of what exists 
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and creative adaptation of new elements. The form, composition and function of academic 
units across the three universities have been more or less transformed in a similar manner 
except in AAU where provisions for both the new domineering trend and the former 
collegial tradition are blended. In all the three universities, academic units that had 
traditionally been running separate programs in similar areas are now streamlined together 
as one academic unit. This marked the eventual demise of the conception of department as 
a single discipline/single academic program. Complimentary to this, decision-making both 
in administrative and academic sphere has been devolved to the academic units in a way 
thought to avoid unnecessary and expensive arrangements and waste of resources. Even 
though the vertical hierarchies of legislative, regulatory and executive power give way to 
laterally collegial structures in all the three universities, the structures and bodies in 
Hawassa University and Mekele University medium levels in general and lower levels in 
particular have been found to be selective as it is not inclusive and accessible to all 
academic staffs. In a similar inclination, hegemony of domineering relation has been 
evidenced as academic leadership positions become tenured. This has also been reinforced 
further by the mammoth administrative and academic power academic executives are 
granted. In a modestly different inclination, in AAU, a relative leaning to reinforce the 
collegial and participatory structures has been evidenced not only by the creation of new 
governing bodies in which all academic staffs are directly included but also by the fact 
that the supreme governing bodies at each level are chaired by elected chairman. 
4.2.3 Autonomy and Patterns of Power Distribution in Academic Units 
Central to the bottom heavy conception of universities is the autonomy of academic units 
in a sense that they are not governed top-down through chains of command that cascade 
decisions from higher to lower echelons. As opposed to the traditional single-line 
bureaucracy, each unit in a university structure is normally deemed to have its own 
autonomy though hierarchically accountable to bodies at higher levels. This tradition is 
different from country to country and institution to institution. As is the case elsewhere, in 
the Ethiopian HE system the autonomy of internal academic units emanates from the 
statutory (See Article 18, Sub-article 2 of HEP No.650/2009:4986). However, the 
statutory provides only general stipulation leaving particulars to be determined by the 
respective institution. Hence, individual institutions may differ in the range and scope of 
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decision-making powers they allow their academic units to exercise. In this regard, as has 
been documented in the universities preliminary assessment before the BPR initiative, 
autonomy of academic units was highly circumscribed (see AAU 2011, HU 2008b & MU 
2008c). Two related rationales can be thought with respect to this. The first could be the 
fact that the status of most of the academic units in the previous system was designated as 
department. Though these units are formally deemed to enjoy substantial autonomy 
academically, their financial and administrative autonomy in particular has conventionally 
been insignificant. Second, the over-centralization of authority in the hands of central 
executives heavily undermined the autonomy of academic units. Though the heart of 
decision-making at each level is formally delineated to lie in the collegial academic 
bodies, a steady drift of power in favor of institutional leaders was found to have been a 
trend over the years (Ibid). Owing to these facts, academic units in Ethiopian HEIs had 
long been not in a position to enjoy their statutorily granted autonomy.  
As a means to cleanse this corrosion, an inclination to empower the units has been 
evidenced after the BPR reform (see AAU 2011, HU 2008c & MU 2008b). The 
universities, as elaborated in the previous section, opted for the flat school organization of 
academic units in place of the previous department based organization. School 
organization endows academic units with full administrative, financial and academic 
control over process within the scope of their academic undertakings. Despite this 
common trend, relative institutional difference has been marked as far as the delineation 
of power distribution between the regulative and executive bodies within the academic 
units is concerned. In this regard, of the three universities, AAU stood out for having a 
very peculiar structure in which effort to balance power between executives and regulative 
bodies has been done. For instance, academic leaders such as schools heads are articulated 
as having responsibility to execute the decisions made by their respective collective 
academic councils. In a similar but more peculiar way, unlike the previous tradition in 
which academic councils at different level are headed by deans and department heads, 
chairmanship of academic councils is appointed by the respective council’s members vote 
(AAU 2011). In the case of the other two universities, an inclination to push assembles of 
academic councils to the periphery has been evidenced. As opposed to their traditional 
role of dictating decision in every aspect of governance in their respective unit, the power 
of such councils is now reduced except on core academic issues where they still have the 
mandate to dictate decision. Academic position holders such as school head by virtue of 
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their position are given more power to enforce decision especially on administrative 
issues. Only on those matters presumed to be essential (especially those which are 
academic in nature and hence, needs collective examination) that they have the obligation 
to seek the decision of their respective academic council (HU 2008c & MU 2008b).  
However, this relative difference among the individual institutions disappears when it 
comes to the selection of academic leaders. As opposed to the previous system, in all the 
three universities, academic leaders such as college deans and school heads are no longer 
elected. Rather, they are to be appointed on tenure basis by the respective university 
management based on meritocratic criteria. Moreover, their position as an executive 
managerialist leader is boasted though the degree is found to vary from institution to 
institution with AAU being the least responsive to this. Their position is further 
strengthened by the spiraling of their power in evaluating the performance of academic 
and non-academic staffs under their unit (see AAU 2011, HU 2008c & MU 2008b). 
Hence, the role of executives is now changed from representative executives to 
commanding ones that are more accountable to hierarchical bodies than collegial 
academic councils.  
The move to empower academic leaders is applaudable as it enables institutions to cope 
up with potential drawbacks of over-centralization and tortuous collegial processes. 
Nevertheless, the presence of well-articulated framework is not necessarily a measure of 
guarantee for the exercise of the formally outlined stipulations as the provisions laid by 
the formal system are conditioned by contextual realities. A good case in point is the 
scenario before the reform initiative. Back then, as clarified elsewhere in this study, 
practicability of governance as laid by the law had always been a problem. Therefore, a 
thorough analysis of empirical functioning of the new arrangement is needed to grasp how 
far the power devolution endeavor is practically put into action. In this regard, most of the 
interviewees are found to have reservation. The first group of interviews forwarded their 
concern in relation to the government’s commitment to the ideals of power devolution. 
The following interview response represents typical view in this category. 
Many academic decisions including program expansion and curriculum review are still heavily 
influenced by ministry of education. Let alone departments and faculties at the lower level, even 
the university leadership itself does not have the real authority when it comes to initiating new 
programs, curriculum revision and admitting students. They do it in accordance with the detailed 
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directives given by the ministry office. For instance, the admission of students to graduate 
program is determined by ministry of education. No individual institution and department has a 
say on it. The departments that harbor the concerned program are obliged to admit students 
assigned by the government irrespective of whether the assigned students fulfill the admission 
criteria set for the respective program of study. The worst part is not only this but also the fact 
that they are forced to take in a much larger number of students than what they actually can 
accommodate. (Interviewee 2, AAU) 
Indeed, astute assessment of governments’ practice after the reform does not defy the 
doubt on its commitment. The government is still censured for undermining institutions 
and their units’ autonomy as the arbitrary authority over various internal affairs of the 
HEIs is still evident (see Assefa 2008, Gemeda 2008, Mehari 2010, US 2009 and 2010).  
Putting the perspective of those respondents who relate the autonomy of academic units to 
lack of government’s commitment aside, we find another pool of respondents fully 
concentrated on the practical experience they encounter in the day to day operation of 
their respective universities. Most of the respondents from this group applauded the 
endeavor to instill the ideals of decentralization and a handful of them even went on to 
pointing to constructive developments.  
The idea of promoting departments’ autonomy is agreeable by all constituents in the university 
community. This is not a new issue. It has been around beginning from the inception of the sector 
and the provisions for this have been included in the law. The initial experience in the BPR 
initiative so far is somehow constructive. The university incumbents showed their commitment not 
only by promoting the reform initiative but also by taking the initiative to practically pursue the 
ideals embodied in the reform though the process may not be as smooth as thought. (Interviewee 1, 
MU)  
Nonetheless, majority of the interviewees had reservation when it comes to the practical 
aspects of the reform though they are in absolute content with the essence of the endeavor. 
According to them, the most pressing threat to the autonomy of units is not external but 
internal. Their response reveals the trend of university leaders to regard their offices as 
dominions of power from where they micromanage operating level units. The following 
interview responses represent the typical view in this regard. 
Schools are formally acknowledged to have the mandate to decide on issues within the scope of their 
discipline. … However, often times, this provision is limited only in paper as academic officers in the 
higher level override departments intentionally or non-intentionally. Sometimes they force schools to 
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take decision in favor of a given issues and other times they ignore schools’ decision. (Interviewee 3, 
MU) 
The autonomy granted to academic unit has often been subject to central executives’ sarcastic 
action. They are selective. They opt to refer to the new structure only in those matters that 
appeared to be in line with their interest. They respect lower units’ decision only on those matters 
that appear to be less important to them and on those issues where the decision of the respective 
academic unit is in line with their intent. (Interviewee 4, HU) 
Table 3 - Academic staffs’ perception towards the level of centralization/decentralization in 
their respective university academic wing 
Name of Institution Name of Institution Combined 
Average 
Ch-square 
value AAU HU MU 
Selecting College and School level 
academic leaders 
Mean 2.79 2.45 1.86 2.34 0.046 
N 24 29 29 82 
Selecting new faculty Mean 2.33 2.21 1.83 2.13 0.357 
N 24 29 24 77 
Faculty promotion/tenure decisions Mean 2.29 2.31 2.96 2.53 0.102 
N 24 29 28 81 
Determining use of resources Mean 2.42 2.17 2.93 2.51 0.047 
N 24 29 29 82 
Approving new academic programs and 
courses 
Mean 3.29 2.52 3.04 2.93 0.108 
N 24 29 28 81 
Deciding on routine academic issues Mean 2.87 2.62 3.45 2.99 0.184 
N 23 29 29 81 
Composite decentralization/centralization 
variable created by the average of the six 
statements* 
Mean 2.65 2.38 2.58   
 
Note – Respondents were asked to assess the level of centralization/decentralization in their respective 
university academic wing  in relation to the aforementioned statements on a five point scale that 
runs from extremely centralized (1) to extremely decentralized (5). The figures in columns 3-5 are 
average scores per university and the 6 column shows combined average value for all the three 
universities while the last provides the Chi-square test values between the independent variable, 
university, and the respective decision making areas to see if there is statistically significant 
pattern that makes any of the universities different from others (See Appendix A-2). In order to 
reduce the number of responses having less than 5 cell count, the five point scale response label is 
re-grouped into a three point scale that runs from Dissatisfied Centralized to Decentralized.  
Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as more centralized and > 3.5 as more decentralized. A score 
between 2.5 and 3.5 is interpreted as blend of both.   
*   All the values for each of the six decision making areas are pooled together to create composite 
indicator variable that, in general terms, show staffs perception towards decision making in their 
respective university academic wing. It is hoped that this composite variable shows staffs’ 
perception in general terms as it is the product of their own self-rating for the respective decision 
making areas. 
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This frustration of interviewees is somehow reflected in the response of academic staffs. 
Academic staffs from the three universities were asked to assess whether decisions in their 
institution in relation to certain academic issues are dictated dominantly by central 
management. The result, as shown in Table 5 reveals a more or less similar perception. 
With all mean scores being lower than 3.5 for all the decision making areas, no perception 
towards decentralization is observed in any of the statements. Rather, majority of the 
decision-making areas, except decision on academic routines and approval of academic 
programs, are perceived by the staffs as being somewhat centralized. However, a closer 
look at of the figures for each institution across the six decision-making areas shows that 
there is moderate difference in between AAU on one side and the other two universities 
on the other side as AAU’s figures lean positively in relative terms. The Chi-square values 
computed to determine whether or not this pattern is statistically significant are far greater 
than the reliability 0.01 level making the interpretation made by the descriptive analysis 
safe.   
All these concerns point to the customary paradox in decentralization. It is normal for the 
upper bodies to lose control over some aspects to the extent the lower bodies are promoted 
to be autonomous. This may, however, prompt higher level leaders who are accustomed to 
command and control style of governance to resist the move consciously or 
unconsciously. This in turn may lead to winds of recentralization even when the efforts of 
decentralization rhetorically continue. The question is therefore maintaining the desired 
balance that enables upper bodies to more efficiently and effectively coordinate the efforts 
of lower units without compromising the autonomy of the latter. In such provisions, the 
role of the central administration should be that of strategic in a sense that they act in a 
way that influence not the day-to-day routines but the long run behavior and actions of 
units. The way top management adjust their new roles is thus critical to the reform 
success.  
As opposed to the views reflected so far, few interviewees labeled departments as the 
major setbacks for effective implementation of the provisions laid by the new system.  
They stressed that the pinpointed problem is confined not only in the central leaders but 
also in the academic units themselves. The following interview response of one school 
head is the typical one among the interview responses under this category. 
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The BPR initiative has devolved power to the lower levels. However, in practice, they are not 
empowered. This is so not only because of the central management bodies but also the units 
themselves. Those in the higher hierarchy are filled with the old state of mind. So are the lower level 
units. We at the lower levels usually refer to the approval and consultation of central leaders in 
making decisions when in fact the issue under consideration is within the scope of our jurisdiction. 
So, in my view, the problem resides in both the upper and the lower bodies. (Interviewee 3, HU) 
Indeed, there is no problem with consulting the upper level in crucial and relevant aspects 
but if it is meant for seeking approval and decision making even in those areas deemed to 
be within the jurisdiction of lower units, it would be self-defeating. The presence of such 
habits shows how past rules of thumb affect actors’ behavior within the new framework. It 
shows what role the leadership of individual universities needs to play. The central leaders 
have strong role to play not only in transferring authority and resources to the units but 
also guarding against any intentional or non-intentional intrusion that endangers the units’ 
autonomy and thereby boost the confidence of lower level officers to act independently 
within the scope of their responsibility area. 
In general terms, the qualitative analysis along with the quantitative made so far suggests 
the presence of discrepancy between what has formally been articulated and what has 
practically been put in place. Hence, it can be said that even though decision-making 
bodies from central university level all the way to operating level units are established in a 
way that enable the devolution of authority from higher to lower levels, in practical terms, 
the lower units are being entangled with centralization of administrative and academic 
decisions and arbitrary interference in their routines by top university and government 
incumbents. This tells that the empirical functioning of the new system is far from what it 
ought to be.  
4.2.4 Staff participation in institutional management and decision making 
processes 
Central to the governing of universities is its participatory structures through which 
faculties take active part in institutional management and decision-making processes. As 
mentioned elsewhere in this study, the formal framework for institutional governance in 
Ethiopian universities before the BPR initiative is erected on structures that emphasize the 
importance of faculty involvement in a wide range of institutional management and 
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academic decisions. Nevertheless, practical account of the sector’s experience revealed 
how the ideals embodied in the formal framework have gradually become an exception 
than a rule (see AAU 2011, HU 2008b & MU 2008c). The essence of the BPR reform was 
thus not questionable. All interviewees manifested their content with the reform initiative 
blatantly. This view has also been reflected among the academic staff respondents. As 
shown below in Table 4, majority of the academic staffs perceived the initiative positively 
though a handful of them shown reservation especially in MU. Even among those 
respondents who have reservation, majority responded that they were indifferent regarding 
the initiative, making the proportion of those who palpably reacted against the initiative 
insignificant. Thus, in general terms, it can be said that the staffs of the universities did 
not ponder to pose setback with respect to the reform initiative.  
Table 4 - Perception of academic staffs on the essence of reform 
How do you agree on the essence of such radical reform in Ethiopian Universities? 
Label Name of Institution 
AAU HU MU Agregate 
Freq Cum % Fre
q 
Cum % Freq
u 
Cum % Freq Cum % 
Strongly Agree 2 8.3 5 17.2 3 11.1 10 12.5 
Agree 11 54.2 13 62.1 9 44.4 33 53.8 
Indifferent 6 79.2 7 86.2 5 63.0 18 76.3 
Disagree 5 100 2 93.1 8 92.6 15 95.0 
Strongly 
Disagree 
0 100 2 100 2 100 4 100.0 
Total 24  29  27  80  
 
Note –The respondents were asked whether they agree on the essence of BPR reform in Ethiopian 
Universities on a five point scale that runs from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5). The 
figures in main column headings 2-4 shows the proportion of respondents per university and the 
5th column shows combined average proportion for all the three universities.  
Having such consensus in a time where the universities are trying to transform their 
system is vital. However, this collective stand does not hold when it comes to the 
participation of staffs in the reform initiative. The universities’ officials claim that they 
maneuvered the reform in a way that participate staffs. In this regard, they point to the 
orientation of BPR implementation as foundation on which staff participation is 
revitalized. Each individual institution claimed to have included staffs as core members of 
the BPR teams (AAU 2011, HU 2008b and MU 2008c). Indeed, BPR implementation in 
the country’s public institutions can be thought to be more participatory and inclusive than 
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other reform initiatives preceding it. However, this does not emanate from the conviction 
of the universities’ incumbents; neither did it emerge from the government’s commitment. 
It emanates from the nature of BPR as a reform tool. As opposed to other top-down 
reform tools, BPR in its very nature is a micro-management tool that targets 
revolutionizing individual institution’s internal dynamics by a cross-functional teams 
composed of professionals from the respective functional areas to be reengineered (see 
Davenport & Short 1990, Hammer and Champy 1993, Johansson et al 1993; Towers 1994 
and Furey 1993).This grass-root blended orientation requires departing away from the 
linear hierarchical top-down conception of implementation. Maassen & Van Vught (2002) 
stressed that in circumstances where the center’s controlling capacity is to a large extent 
limited; the traditional top-down bureaucratic ways are impractical. Rather, it needs the 
conception of synthesized participatory approach in which both the top-down and bottom-
up perspectives are intermingled in such a way that all organizational constituents are 
incorporated in the processes instead of the elitist influencing the whole process from 
above.  
Table 5 - Perception of academic staffs on their participation in the reform initiative in their 
respective university 
How do you rate the participation of academic staffs in the BPR reform initiative at your university? 
Label Name of Institution Agregate Total 
Addis Ababa University Hawassa University Mekele University 
Freq Com % Freq Com % Freq Com % Fre
q 
Com % 
Extremely low 0 0 6 20.7 11 37.9 17 20.7 
Low 14 58.3 13 65.5 8 65.5 35 63.4 
Moderate 9 95.8 8 93.1 8 93.1 25 93.9 
High 1 100.0 2 100.0 2 100.0 5 100.0 
Extremly High 0 100.0 0 100.0 0 100.0 0 100.0 
Total 24  29  29  82  
 
Note – The respondents were asked to assess the level of their participation in implementing the reform 
initiative in their respective university on a five point scale that runs from extremely low (1) to 
extremely high (5). The figures in main column headings 2-4 shows the proportion of 
respondents per university and the 5th column shows combined average proportion for all the 
three universities.  
Even though the orientation pursued goes hand in glove with the peculiar characteristics 
of HEIs inherent character - organizational fragmentation, the diffusion of the decision-
making power and the grassroots character of innovations, majority of the interviewees 
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pointed that the reform initiative is not participatory and fluid as it ought to be. The 
following extracts from the interview responses are a good indication of the typical 
perception of respondents on the issue. 
Relative to previous reforms, BPR reform can be said to be more participatory in principle…. But 
when I take into account the way it was put in place in our university, I dare to say that it is not 
participatory. BPR teams in our university are set up in such a way that mostly position holders and 
individuals related or intimate to the incumbents in one way or another are included. … The process 
of selecting team members is not transparent. The reform is planned by a handful of few staffs that 
are selected this way…. I personally don’t think that people selected this way are representative to 
the university community. With this fact in hand, it is difficult to say that the staff is adequately 
participated in the reform initiative. (Interviewee 1 AAU) 
I would say staff’s participation is limited. Only a handful staffs participated in the reform process. 
Even from those who took part, majority are participated only in the teaching-learning process. … Of 
course, there were training and feedback sessions and I believe this is a kind of experience that must 
be reinforced. … In these meetings, a number of feedbacks in relation to the implementation of the 
proposed system were raised by many staffs and the university incumbents promised to integrate those 
legitimate feedbacks. However, when the reform is put in place at the end of the day, none of the 
given feedbacks was incorporated into the proposed system; neither did the issues agreed to be taken 
care before the implementation of the reform. The incumbents simply tried to push their own agenda 
down without any compromise. (Interviewee 4, HU) 
As can be observed from Table 5 in the previous page, similar tone of discontent is found 
in the perception of academic staffs. Majority of them are found to have reservation. The 
trend across the three universities does not differ as only a handful of the respondents in 
each university rate their participation as moderate.  
When it comes to the provisions for staff participation in the new structure, astute 
examination divulges paradoxical patterns. In some aspects, the new arrangement can be 
thought to provide staffs with greater opportunity to participate in governing bodies. From 
another perspective, contradictory inclination that might pose threat to staff participation 
can be evidenced. A good case in point is the provisions for the participation of academic 
staffs in university level governing bodies- senate and university council. As has been 
discussed elsewhere, academic staffs’ participation in university senate in the previous 
legislation is limited to two representatives with all other members of the senate being ex-
officio members. Contrary to this, the new statutory designates university senate and 
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university council to be primarily composed of academic staffs (see Article 50 and 56, 
HEP No.650/2009:5014). This when seen in its facade view may point to the proclivity of 
the new arrangement for improved staff participation.  
However, careful review of the statutory reveals how staff participation is brought under 
the sphere of incumbents’ discretion as the decision on who joins these bodies vest in the 
hands of university president. Two issues emerge out of this. The first is a concern of how 
far such personal authority would be practiced in accordance with the objective criteria set 
by the law. The statutory requires the process of selecting would-be members to base on 
purely meritorious criteria. However, when the final decision on matters of such 
importance vests in the hands of a single individual, it enhances the ability of the 
individual holding the decisive position to have edge over collective regulatory bodies and 
this in turn poses potential setback to accountability. The fact that Ethiopia is a country 
where transparent and democratic governance is not practiced and authority is usually 
twisted arbitrarily in personal terms adds fuel to the dilemma. Secondly, even in standard 
democracies, where transparency and rule of law dictates, a move from election to 
appointment is empirically evidenced to signify accompanying change in accountability 
structure (see Besley and Coate 2003, Fields et al 1997, Maskin and Tirole 2001). Elected 
position holders are reported to behave in a manner different from their appointed counter 
parts. When positions are held through election process, it would mean that the respective 
constituency has direct input. This under normal circumstances makes elected position 
holders more responsive to and representative of their constituency as they need support 
to get re-elected or could be revoked from their position if they lack the trust of their 
constituency. Whereas, if they are appointed, there will be an insulating layer with their 
constituency as their stance is not dependent on their constituency but appointing body. 
This in turn makes their action bundled with the interests of the appointing elites and their 
own intrinsic motivations rather than their constituency’s interest (Ibid). Taken from this 
perspective, this casts doubt whether academic staffs selected to the senate and university 
council by the bureaucracy incline to promote the interest of their respective academic 
community. A good concern in point is the following interview response, which is already 
used elsewhere in this study to reflect on related aspect-  
I don’t understand the rationale why university president is given the dominion of choosing 
majority of senate members. This may transplant a potential incongruity that may endanger the 
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participatory and collective decision making within the senate. Through time, presidents may tend 
to use their right as a power base to avoid challenges from the members of senate by designating 
only those academics that they can easily manipulate.  (Interviewee 1, AAU). 
Similar change in the accountability structure down in the hierarchy can be expected. As 
discussed elsewhere thoroughly, in the former system, academic leaders below presidency 
level were subject to staffs’ election. Nonetheless, in the new system this practice has 
been replaced by tenured system in which position holders are to be appointed by the 
respective bureaucratic leader. According to the afore-discussed perspective, this would 
transplant change in the responsiveness of school heads/ deans. Some staffs claimed to 
have already felt the winds. The following interview response is among the forwarded 
concerns. 
Academic leaders these days are acting as bossy. I don’t know, perhaps it is because they get their 
position by competition rather than by election. In the old days, they used to be seen as colleagues. 
But these days, that is apparently changing as I perceived it in my own experience. (Interviewee 4, 
HU) 
When it comes to the participation of staffs in middle level bodies such as college and 
school councils, no apparent change has been evidenced except in AAU where more 
participatory structures are designated. In AAU, unlike the previous traditions which 
restricts the membership of college level governing bodies to ex-officio members, 
academic staffs are now entitled to the membership of the college governing bodies. For 
instance, college council is designated to bring not only all academic officers but also all 
senior faculty members of the academic units under a college. In a more indulgent trend, 
in the next hierarchy - School level, the supreme academic governing body, Staff 
Assembly, is formed as congregation of all academic staffs in the faculty (see AAU 2011 
& 2010 for detail). As opposed to this, in the other two universities no change has been 
evidenced in the composition of governing bodies at medium level. At Hawassa 
University, as departments are promoted to assume more authority, the middle (college) 
level body has been called off except in College of Agriculture and Wondogenet Forestry 
College, where college is still designated to have its traditional role in academic 
governance (HU 2008a & HU 2008c). In Mekele University, college level governing 
bodies are delineated in such a way that they would bring all academic officers in the 
college together (MU 2008a & MU 2008b). Thus, staff representative by virtue of their 
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position are allowed to have representation in the council. Apart from that, no other 
provision has been stipulated for inclusion of staffs. At the understructure of Hawassa 
University and Mekele University, an even tighter tendency is noticed. Before the BPR 
initiative, all academic staffs under a given department were entitled to the membership of 
their respective unit’s governing body. However, this practice is completely abandoned in 
the new system. Now the governing body in the lower academic units, School Council, is 
composed of streams/ module team leaders, research unit/team leaders, research and 
program quality assessment team leaders and staff and student representatives. Academic 
staffs with no leadership position in any of these teams are exclusively filtered out of the 
council. Their participation is confined only in their respective team where they can 
participate on academic matters within their specialization. However, in practical terms, 
this formal framework has not been implemented wholly in all institutions. The following 
interview response is a good instance in this regard.  
Even though the new arrangement requires schools to organize their academic staffs in accordance 
with modular teams specialization, this has not yet been implemented in all units in our university due 
to implementation complexities. As a means to curb up this, each degree program under our school is 
assigned program coordinators under whom staffs are organized. This is an informal structure which 
we use until we organize staffs according to the formal specialization based arrangement. Owing to 
this, school council could not be organized as delineated in the legislation but more or less similar 
pattern emerged as most schools opt to include only program coordinators and few senior staffs. 
Hence, not all academic staffs are members of schools councils. (Interviewee 3, HU) 
With all these in mind, it can be said that a more selective provision that circumscribe 
staff’s participation is instilled at the understructure of the two universities hierarchy. 
Contrary to this, in the case of AAU, the participatory structures designated for college 
level found their way down to academic units. Hence, as is the case at college level, 
school’s supreme governing body is formed as congregation of all staffs under the 
respective school. Thus, in comparison to Mekele University and Hawassa University, 
where the provisions for staff participation are found to be circumscribed procedurally, 
Addis Ababa University can be said to infuse more inclusive structures.  
In an effort to grasp how far the practical experience is in line with the formal delineation, 
both groups of respondents, academic leaders and staffs, were asked to give their 
perception regarding staffs’ participation in academic governance after the BPR reform. 
Most of the academic leaders pointed out that there have been no significant change 
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except minor modifications. Though they admit that some of the provisions could 
constrain fluid staff participation, they claimed the presence of active staff interaction. 
The following interview responses are the ones in reference to this view. 
The participation of staffs was supposed to be better from the previous system. However, in practical 
terms, I have to confess the continuity of the status quo. Even though there are provisions for staffs’ 
participation in the new system, not all such provisions are put in place owing to a wide range of 
institutional problems. But then again, the participation of staff even in the previous system is not that 
bad. We had and still have the experience of active staff participation in academic decisions, though I 
would not say that what we have right now is faire enough. (Interviewee 2, AAU) 
The academic decision making is formally devolved to the lower academic units. The participation of 
staff in school’s governing bodies is however more selective in the new system than in the previous. 
Back then, academic staffs had the right to membership of their respective departmental governing 
bodies by virtue of their academic tenure. Now membership to such councils is based on position, it is 
not open to all staffs.  However, within this bounded framework, I would say, staffs’ participation in 
our school is good. (Interviewee 3, MU) 
As opposed to the sympathetic view of majority of the academic leaders, a more pessimist 
response has been reflected by a few of those at the lowest level - program coordinators. 
The following response is an exemplary in point of this.  
… The reality on the ground is quite different. I can even say that a more aggravated situation has 
emerged. For example, the council in which staffs have representation is not active as we have had 
only two or three council session this year. Had it been according to the university’s legislation, it 
should have been conducted biweekly. The head makes most of the decisions exclusively. That is the 
emerging trend. (Interviewee 3, MU) 
In order to incorporate the perception of academic staffs, faculties were asked to assess 
their participation in their respective university. They were presented with a set of 
statements relating to their relationship with academic leaders, and specific institutional 
management and decision-making processes. In the discussion to follow, these statements 
are pooled into three categories according to their focus– staff-leader relationship, 
structural provisions for staffs’ participation and emerging leadership practice.  
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Table 6 - Staffs’ perception regarding their relationship with academic leaders in their 
respective institution 
Statement Name of Institution Combine
d 
Average 
AAU HU MU 
Academic leaders have much authoritative power 
to influence staffs and their respective academic 
councils in the current system than in the previous 
system. 
Mea
n 
3.71 3.69 3.72 
3.71 
N 
24 29 29 
82 
Communication between the academic staffs and 
academic leaders is good in the existing system 
than in the former one 
Mea
n 
2.33 2.24 2.00 
2.18 
N 24 29 29 82 
Compared to the experience in the previous 
system, I am kept more informed about what is 
going on at this institution. 
Mea
n 
2.75 3.28 3.31 3.13 
N 24 29 29 82 
 
Note – Respondents were asked to give their rating in relation to the statement presented on a five point 
scale that runs from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The figures in columns 3-5 are 
average scores per university. The figure between under the row N refers to the number of valid 
answers. Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as disagreement and > 3.5 as agreement. A 
score between 2.5 and 3.5 is interpreted as indifferent.  The averaged values for each of the 
three statements across the three universities does not differ that much as the values for each 
statement fell in one interpretation scheme. The data set has been re-examined by cross 
tabulation and percentage analysis in order to see if there is any pattern that is overlooked by 
the averaged values and no different pattern has been found. Hence, the average values can be 
used reliably.  
As shown in Table 6, three statements are labeled under the first category. In reference to 
the first statement, the average values in all the three universities are found to lie a bit 
away from the neutral zone, meaning that academic leaders are perceived to have much 
authoritative power to influence staffs and their respective academic councils in the 
current system than in the previous. As opposed to their higher rating for academic 
leaders’ power, the staffs revealed their discontent when it comes to their relation with 
their respective academic leaders. The average value for all the three universities in this 
regard are found to be far below the neutral zone with MU hitting the lowest at average 
score 2.00. Relating the interpretation for these two statements with what has already been 
uncovered by the analysis of the formal framework in the initial section of this portion 
brings out interesting issue. In the analysis of the formal framework, an inclination to 
implant more powerful executive leadership has been uncovered. Coupling this with the 
afore-discussed perception of staffs pose a question of whether the winds of power change 
have already been felt by the staffs. With respect to the third statement, the staffs are 
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found to have a more lenient view as the scores for all the three universities lie in the 
neutral zone i.e. 2.5 -3.5, though AAU respondents are found to be slightly strained 
compared to HU and MU staffs as their average value lags far behind the score for the 
other two universities. This neutral interpretation of the staffs’ observation to this 
statement would mean that they perceived no change in the newly adopted system with 
respect to the fluid flow of information among the different constituents within the 
universities.  
When it comes to the structural provisions for staffs’ participation, five of the statements 
shown in Table 7 are used as a measure to tap the issue. Each of these statements 
individually focuses on reflecting some particular aspects of the provisions for staff 
participation. They are complementary to one another. With this in mind, the scores for 
each of these statements are pooled together to create an additional 6th composite variable 
that, in general terms, indicates staffs’ perception. In reference to the average score for 
each statement, as can be seen from the table, a more or less similar level of perception 
has been evidenced in all the three universities except in AAU where a more sympathetic 
view has been seen consistently for all the five statements. It is interesting to see this kind 
of difference. As has been clarified in the analysis for the formal framework, compared to 
the other two universities, AAU’s framework is more inclusive. If this difference 
represents a statistically significant pattern, it indicates the reflection of the difference 
uncovered by the formal framework analysis in the staffs’ perceptions. However, the 
higher Pearson Chi-square test values at 0.01 level between the independent variable, 
university, and the respective statements response categories indicates that the 
aforementioned difference does not reflect a statistically significant pattern (See Appendix 
A-4 for detailed test result).  Besides, AAU’s average value for the composite variable 
indicating the level of staff participation in general terms is much closer to the 
disagreement interpretation scheme. Thus, though the average scores for AAU are slightly 
higher than the other universities’ average scores, it would be illogical to interpret AAU 
staffs’ perception differently except the statement ‘The academic decision-making process 
is now more collective and collegial than it was in the previous system’ for which AAU’s 
average score is considerably higher than HU and MU’s scores. For this reason, the 
combined average values are preferred to interpret the staffs’ perception in general terms. 
In this regard, as can be seen from the table, all the values lei below 2.5 indicating the 
wrecked perception of staffs regarding the structural provisions for their participation. 
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Table 7 - Academic staff’s perceptions towards structural provisions for staff participation 
in institutional management and decision making processes in target universities 
Statement Name of Institution Combine
d 
Average 
Chi-
square 
value 
AAU HU MU 
Lack of faculty involvment is not a problem in the 
university's current system in comparison to the 
previous one 
Mea
n 
2.63 2.50 2.24 
2.44 0.062 
N 24 28 29 81 
The academic decision-making process is now 
more collective and collegial than it was in the 
previous system 
Mea
n 
2.92 2.41 2.03 
2.43 0.064 
N 24 29 29 82 
In comparison to the previous system, staffs have 
stronger voice in decision making process of the 
current system 
Mea
n 
2.63 2.00 2.03 2.20 
0.360 
N 24 29 29 82 
Staffs have adequate level of representation in 
governing bodies at each level in the new system 
than in the previous system 
Mea
n 
2.46 2.17 2.21 
2.27 0.578 
N 24 29 29 82 
The new system has more open and suitable 
structures for consultation and participation of 
academic staffs in setting institutional goals, plans 
and policy decisions 
Mea
n 
2.54 2.14 2.24 
2.29 0.320 
N 
24 29 29 
82 
Composite variable indicating the level of staff 
participation in institutional management and 
academic decision making processes in general 
terms* 
Mea
n 
2.58 2.25 2.14 
2.31  
N 
24 28 29 
81 
 
Note – Respondents were asked to give their rating in relation to the statement presented on a five point 
scale that runs from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The figures in columns 3-5 are 
average scores per university and the 6 column shows combined average value for all the three 
universities while the last provides the Chi-square test values between the independent variable, 
university, and the respective statement to see if there is statistically significant pattern that makes 
the universities different from one another (See Appendix A-4 for detailed Chi-square test values). In 
order to reduce the number of responses having less than 5 cell count, the five point scale response 
label is re-grouped into a three point scale that runs from Dissatisfied Centralized to Decentralized. 
The figure between under the row N refers to the number of valid answers. Average score of < 2.5 is 
interpreted as disagreement and > 3.5 as agreement. A score between 2.5 and 3.5 is interpreted as 
indifferent.  
*  All the values for each of the five statements are pooled together to create composite indicator variable 
that, in general terms, show staffs’ perception towards the structural provision for their participation 
in governance.  
In reference to the third category - leadership practice, two statements were sorted out as 
shown in Table 8. Regarding the first, staffs across all the three universities are found to 
be positively lenient as the average scores for all the three universities are inclined to be 
in the neutral interpretation zone 2.5-3.5. This would mean that in the new arrangement, 
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academic leaders are perceived to have an environment at least no bumpier compared to 
the previous system. However, the respondents are not impressed by the behavior of their 
academic leaders as the average score for all the three universities lie deep in the 
disagreement interpretation scheme. 
Table 8– Staff’s perception regarding leadership practice in their university 
Statement Name of Institution Combine
d 
Average 
Ch-square 
value AAU HU MU 
The new system capacitates academic leaders to 
provide competent leadership more effectively and 
efficiently than the previous system 
Mea
n 
3.58 3.28 2.93 
3.24 0.029 
N 24 29 29 82 
Academic leaders are less autocratic and more 
collegial in the new system than the previous 
Mea
n 
2.25 2.17 2.14 
2.18 0.655 
N 24 29 29 82 
 
Note – Respondents were asked to give their rating in relation to the statement presented on a five 
point scale that runs from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The figures in columns 3-5 
are average scores per university and the 6 column shows combined average value for all the 
three universities while the last provides the Chi-square test values between the independent 
variable, university, and the respective statement to see if there is statistically significant pattern 
that makes the universities different from one another (See Appendix A-5 for detail). The figure 
under the row N refers to the number of valid answers. Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as 
disagreement and > 3.5 as agreement. A score between 2.5 and 3.5 is interpreted as indifferent.   
Table 9 - Opinion of academic staff with respect to responsiveness, participatory and 
flexibility of school level governance in their university’s new system 
Governance Dimension Name of Institution Combined 
average  AAU HU MU 
Participatory 3.04 2.59 2.93 2.84 
Responsiveness 2.71 2.17 2.66 2.50 
Flexibility 2.50 2.17 2.17 2.27 
 
Note – The respondents were asked to appraise the academic unit level governance and management 
process at their respective university in relation to the identified dimensions based on a five 
point scale that runs from bad (1) to very good (5). The figures in columns 2-4 are average 
scores per university and the 5th column shows combined average value for all the three 
universities. Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as dissatisfaction and > 3.5 as satisfaction. 
A score between 2.5 and 3.5 is interpreted as a neutral score.  
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In general, the perception of academic staffs is found to tilt negatively compared to the 
academic leaders sympathetic view. This discontent is also evidenced in the staffs’ 
response to the level of participatory, responsiveness and flexibility of governance 
practiced at the academic unit level. As can be observed from Table 9 in the previous 
page, the staffs are found to be not impressed with their school’s/department’s 
performance though AAU’s staffs perception shows marginal distinction from the other 
two.  
In a related aspect, the staffs were asked to give their opinion regarding the level of their 
influence on institutional management and academic decision-making processes in their 
respective universities. Though there are minor differences across the universities, as can 
be observed from Table 10, the overall perception is somehow similar. At all levels, their 
perception lied deep in the not influential interpretation zone. In related perspective, the 
level of their perception across the three universities marked apparent trend of declining 
as we move up hierarchically. 
Table 10 - Staffs’ perception regarding the level of their influence on institutional 
management and academic decision-making processes in their respective universities 
Level Name of Institution Combined 
average AAU HU MU 
Institution level  2.58 2.66 2.66 2.63 
Midium level – College, Faculty 2.08 1.97 2.17 2.07 
Lower level – School and Program unit 1.54 1.46 1.62 1.54 
Composite variable 2.24 2.18 2.31 2.23 
 
Note - Respondents were asked to rate the level of their influence on institutional management and 
academic decision-making processes in their respective universities at different levels on a 
five point scale that runs from least influential (1) to highly influential (5).The figures in 
columns 2-4 are average scores per university and the 5th column shows combined average 
value for all the three universities. Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as not influential and 
> 3.5 as influential. A score between 2.5 and 3.5 is interpreted as moderate.   
In general, all these perceptions of the staffs coupled with the analysis of the formal 
framework for staff participation reveals how far staff participation is from being optimal. 
It would be interesting to see if the staffs’ discontent is related to the reorganization of 
academic units or the sector’s existing tradition. As has been clarified elsewhere in this 
study, the then departments were merged to form more vibrant units called schools. This 
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ultimately resulted in the increase in the span of control for each academic unit as the 
scope of their academic undertaking is expanded. Consequently, academic units now are 
reported to accommodate twofold or more staff than what they used to. This would 
ultimately lead to reduction in staff engagement under normal circumstance as it is 
improbable to have same level of participation when the units had narrow span of control. 
Even if the contribution of this towards lower staffs’ participation is indisputable, as the 
uncovered trend suggest, the ultimate source of lower staff participation may also relate to 
the old officious rule of thumb which found its way into the new system.  
4.2.5 Status of change in the universities 
The ultimate issue in reform endeavor is whether change prevails or not (Gornitzka 1999). 
Changing formal frameworks does not automatically lead to new practices (see Musselin 
2005). Understanding organizational change beyond the formal structures requires 
observation of actual practice and behavior at various levels within the HEIs (Kogan et al 
2006). Providing comprehensive assessment in this regard is beyond this study in part 
owing to the study’s descriptive nature and in part owing to the fact that change is too 
complicated and long-term bounded dynamics to be assessed as a function of single 
intervention over a relatively short period of time. Even then, within this bounded 
perspective, the analysis made so far draws attention to how inconsistent the practical 
experience is. Even though the reform orientation goes hand in glove with the higher 
education literature that the analysis of change in the universities should begin with taking 
into account the peculiar bottom heavy complex structure (Clark 1983; Birnbaum 1988), 
as the analysis in the preceding discussions suggest, the ideals and values embodied in the 
universities new structure are not finding their way in the universities’ day-to-day 
dynamics. As a means to capture precise perception of both academic leaders and staffs on 
the issue, both groups were provided with the forum to solicit their opinion. In this regard, 
both groups forwarded their reservation, though the academic leaders group tended to be 
less pessimistic than their staff counterparts. The following interview response represents 
the typical view shared by most of the interviewees. 
The reform process I would say is well done but when it comes to the subsequent outcomes, it 
depends on what and where you see. In some aspects you see the change dictating while in others 
the previous status quo dictates. For instance, if you see the practical aspects of how academic 
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leaders assume their position, the role and composition of academic decision making bodies, the 
hierarchical relationship between different levels and the likes, the change is profound. But when 
you see other aspects such as the dynamics of decision-making in the academic units and the day 
to day activities, you don’t see much change. All in all, I would say we are still overtaken by the 
old culture in many ways while trying to move forward with the new. (Interviewee 2, HU) 
As already said, the academic staffs manifested an even more pessimistic view. Most of 
them unanimously perceived the status of the change in their universities as insignificant. 
As shown below in Table 11, the perception is more or less similar across all the three 
universities. Within the circumscribed view of insignificancy, the perception of staffs is 
found to take different form from Musselin’s (2005) suggestion of prevalence of 
continuity of old ways as one move down in the hierarchy to the operating level units. 
Here, according to the staffs’ perception, the middle level units are the ones where the 
impacts of the reform prevailed more profoundly than the institution and operating level 
units. All in all, as the perception of both groups indicate, the reform endeavor seems to 
be caught in setback. 
Table 11 - Staff’s perception regarding the level of change in their respective university 
 Level Name of Institution Combined 
average AAU HU MU 
Institution level  Mean 1.87 1.59 2.31 1.93 
N 24 29 29 82 
Midium level – College, 
Faculty 
Mean 2.37 2.69 3.03 2.72 
N 24 29 29 82 
Lower level – School and 
Program unit 
Mean 1.79 1.62 1.90 1.73 
N 24 29 29 82 
Composite variable* Mean 2.02 1.98 2.32 2.14 
N 24 29 29 82 
 
Note - Respondents were asked to rate the level of change in their respective university at different 
levels on a five point scale that runs from no change at all (1) to radical change (5). The figures 
in columns 3-5 are average scores per university and the 6th column shows combined average 
value for all the three universities. Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as insignificant change 
and > 3.5 as indicator significant change. A score between 2.5 and 3.5 is interpreted as 
moderate.   
The challenges of continuity of old ways is what has been evidenced empirically in the 
HE sector over the years (see Musselin 2005, Bleiklie and Henkel 2005). The experience 
of adopting new academic governance and management techniques from business, as 
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studies reveal, proved not to be as effective as claimed when conditioned by the 
institutional atmosphere and tradition of HEIs (Birnbuam 2001). As Massen and Van 
Vught (2002) remarked, trying to transfer business instruments, techniques and systems to 
higher education altogether is inherently precarious. This is so because academic cultures, 
values and beliefs in universities for most part evolve to protect the legitimate interest of 
researchers and teachers. Any move including those generated from within the university 
itself could fail if they are meant to compromise this (Clark 1983).  
In this regard, the basic purpose at which the BPR reform in Ethiopia targeted is to bring 
about effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness in service delivery of public 
institutions, which require capitalizing on the economic dimensions of institutions, 
whereas the academic values and traditions are deeply ingrained in the social dimension of 
institutions. This incompatibility along with the sector’s old problems may provide 
interesting explanation of why the institutionalization of newly introduced values is 
constrained. Besides, lack of trust in between the academic community and the 
incumbents can also provide part of the elucidation. As the response of both the academic 
leaders and staffs groups indicates (majority of the academic staffs indicated this 
perception in response to the open-ended question provided to them), the reform initiative 
seemed to have been interpreted by bulk of the academic community as government’s 
continual endeavor to bring the country’s HEIs under the functional needs of incumbent 
politicians. Hence, no matter how profound the changes in the formal arrangement could 
be, all these and related factors seems to impede the reform’s outcome leading to 
Musselin’s (2005) idea of prevalence of continuity of old ways. This eventually lead to 
hybrid glance of mix in which winds of the change are felt in some aspects, while in other 
aspects discrepancy between what formally is defined by the structure and how people 
actually do dominates. 
4.3   Reflection on the Organizational Response of the Universities 
A search for appropriate organizational blueprint and operational operandi of any entity 
needs to have a design most suited to its size, scope and areas of operation and 
specialization. In this regard, the three targeted universities have different perspectives. In 
terms of scope and size, none of the other two is comparable to the country’s giant 
institution, AAU, which continues to be a pace-setter in the nation’s HE sector. It differs 
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from the two in that it is essentially a collection of many geographically dispersed 
campuses, has much larger enrollment than the two combined and has peculiar direction 
of development. Both the two universities, Hawassa and Mekele, are the outgrowth of 
special institutions, which still maintains their caliber as major actor in shaping their 
respective university’s internal dynamics. Contrary to this, no institute, college or faculty 
has such legacy in AAU. AAU accommodates a relatively diversified community partly 
owing to its long years’ heritage and partly due to its background as an amalgamation of a 
number of geographically dispersed colleges. Thus, compared to the other two 
universities, it is more of a federalized university – an association of colleges than an 
institution tightly integrated around particular organizational identity. Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to expect the organizational structure of the universities to reflect these 
organizational differences. 
However, this is not reflected much in the universities organizational response. Even 
though the orientation of the BPR initiative pave the way for ambivalent trend, the 
institutions reaction to the reform is found to fall more or less within a single response 
strategy, acquiescence among others, as all the three universities in the end showed 
apparent move towards strong executive leadership ideal. As has been uncovered in the 
analysis made so far, a more analogous trend has been witnessed among the universities 
though AAU is found to stand out marginally from the other two. Indeed, the preliminary 
arrangement proposed by the universities before the revision of the legal framework 
marked relative difference. As it had a blend of reactions ranging from unconscious and 
conscious obedience to partial conformity with the values and requirements of the reform, 
it would have made the universities response accommodate actions ranging from simple 
acquiescence to compromise. Nevertheless, much of the divergence trend evidenced in the 
initial organizational arrangement of the universities has been concealed by the provisions 
of the recently revised legislation. Even in this circumscribed response boundary, AAU is 
found to respond in a slightly different manner as it tries to balance the new trend, i.e. 
managerial ideal with the collegial structures down in its structure. 
This comes as no surprise as the Ethiopian context inherently does not provide institutions 
with the ground to pursue their own action in real terms as is normally the case in 
developing countries where governments are capable enough to use a wide range of 
control instruments ranging from coercive to normative ones. In this regard, the analytical 
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framework drawn provides insightful tool to explicate the underlying conditions leading 
to the similarity in the universities response. So as to relate how the government enacted 
its influences through meandering instruments, let me refer to Scott’s (1998) category of 
organizational environment- technical and institutional. As delineated in the analytical 
framework, the government in the context of Ethiopian HE is the prime actor in 
technical/task environment as it is the main source of economic resource for universities 
and the main end user of their output. In relation to the BPR initiative, though donors and 
lenders like IMF and World Bank are participated, the money is channeled to the 
respective institutions through government and hence, the means is still under the 
discretion of the latter as is always the case. Likewise, in the institutional environment it 
has strong instruments through which it influences the behavior of its subjects such as 
rules, laws and regulatory mechanisms and governmental agencies and quasi-public 
institutions whose independency is manipulated to serve governmental interests. In 
specific reference to BPR in the universities, providing training and conference sessions 
for BPR teams of the universities falls under these for instance. In a similar way, its 
attempt to shape the overall organizational structure of the universities through the new 
proclamation falls under the sphere of institutional environment. In general terms, as 
evidenced by its deeds, the government managed to influence the response of universities 
in circuitous manner.  
However, this does not mean that the government exerted mechanical pressure on all 
universities at same level, neither were its influences linear. Being an independent actor, 
the universities proved to respond in a slightly different way according to their 
background. A good case in point is the difference found in between AAU on one side and 
MU and HU on the other. Though the institution level arrangement across the universities 
is considerably similar due to the provisions of the law, the downward hierarchy of AAU 
puts diversified set of decision-making arrangements which involve both selective 
regeneration of existing structure and creative adaptation of new bodies whereas in 
Hawassa University and Mekele University, regeneration and renovating existing 
structures has been the trend. In line with this, the medium and lower level arrangements 
of AAU are found to be slightly different from the other two as AAU’s structure tend to 
be more open, collegial and accessible to staffs compared to MU’s and HU’s hierarchical 
and selective structures. Thus, specifying the universities response as a solitary 
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consequence of government’s deliberative action is too sensitive though its role is 
incontestable.  
In this regard, assessment of the adaptation process the universities passed through in 
view of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) bridging process, isomorphism mechanisms, i.e. 
coercive, mimetic and normative, provides insightful elucidation as to how governmental 
influence forms only one of the underlying causes though it is the most decisive one. As it 
is evidenced in the application of rigid criteria such as the revision of legal framework and 
the wide range of training and consultation sessions, coercive pressure can be considered 
as the prominent one of the three forces of isomorphism. The analysis in the previous 
sections revealed how these hampered heterogeneous responses. The presence of this can 
also be explained from Hannan and Freeman’s (1989) population ecology perspective. As 
uncovered elsewhere, convergence trend emerged as the universities sought to get 
government’s legitimacy by adapting their organizational system to the revised 
framework. Parallel with this, of the remaining two isomorphisis forces, the role of 
mimetic isomorphism in shaping the response of the universities can be evidenced in a 
more prominent way. It is evidenced by the universities benchmarking and experience 
sharing culture. Indeed, the hegemony of mimetic forces as decisive bridging force is 
engineered by the government through its policy of peer-to-peer experience sharing. All in 
all, the government is not the sole actor in maneuvering the similarity and perhaps, the 
homogeneous trend might have emanated from the anticipation of individual universities 
to governmental expectation. In anyway, from the above discussions, the soaring role of 
the government in promoting convergent trend is markedly evident, be it through coercive 
or mimetic mechanisms or in the form of individual institution’s competition for 
government’s legitimacy.  
4.4 Reflection on the Universities Institutional Governance – where is it 
projected to? 
The universities responded more or less in line with the ideals of BPR - creating 
decentralized structure that capacitate operating level units to have full control of their 
processes from start to end. The new arrangement involves both selective regeneration of 
what exists and creative adaptation of new elements. With this, the form, composition and 
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function of academic decision making bodies, leadership positions and the role of all other 
constituents across the universities is more or less transformed in a way that embed strong 
executive leadership in place of representative leadership ideals. Vertically, the basic 
academic units all the way to university leadership are structured in a way that enables 
devolution of power from higher to lower levels. With the power devolution endeavor, the 
role and function of bodies in the medium hierarchy i.e. College has been undermined as 
itsr traditional authority is pushed down to the operating level units. Eventually, colleges 
now serve as a forum for coordination of administrative and miscellaneous services to 
academic units. They normally don’t have role in the day-to-day academic and 
administrative decision-making of academic units.  Alongside the hierarchical 
delineations, the horizontal differentiations at each level give way to the collegial 
academic councils such as Senate, College Council and School Council. However, the 
power of these bodies is reduced compared to what they used to have in the previous 
system. With these, a well-articulated hierarchical chain of command that cascades power 
from the higher echelon to the lower level operating units has been set. In general, what 
appears to emerge as delineated by the new arrangement is a blend of ambivalent 
predicament in which managerially domineering approach is coupled with collegial 
dealings in such a way that the managerialist approach prevail especially in MU and HU.  
Figure 13 - Changing power in Ethiopian HEIs hierarchal levels after BPR initiative 
 
Coupling this inclination with the waves of governmentally initiated reform endeavors 
prior to BPR over the past two decades gives perceptive depiction of where the Ethiopian 
HEIs organizational functioning is formally meant to head. However, before reflecting on 
the contemporary reform rhetoric in the country’s HE, let me pay brief visit to the sector’s 
prevalent characteristics preceding the reform rhetoric in order to show the direction of 
the formal deliberations more clearly. In this regard, from the very beginning the 
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government has been playing mono-centric role in formulating policies, rules and 
decisions that determine universities day to day affairs and character. The universities 
were fully funded from public resources with no private contribution at all and hence, 
were micro-managed the government from the center. Government used to routinely 
appoint university officials and academic staffs. All non-academic staffs were civil 
servants managed by the national civil service commission rather than by university 
executives. Line item budgets prevailed and institutional allocations were increased 
incrementally from one year to the next with little or no relation to enrollments or 
educational outcomes. Besides, additional income generated by institutions used to be 
deducted from their government subventions creating a strong disincentive for income 
diversification (Gemeda 2008, Saint 2004, Yimam 2008).).  
When it comes to the contemporary reform rhetoric, the issuance of the 2003 Higher 
Education Proclamation (HEP) marks a turning point. The proclamation manifested a 
clear deliberation to move away from existing arrangement. A good instance in view of 
this is the redistribution of the state’s power in different direction- downward as HEIs are 
granted greater autonomy and outward as traditional tasks of the state moved to the quasi-
public agencies. Downward, it gave the universities substantial autonomy so that they can 
be free standing institution whose administration is carried out in the name of an 
independent board. This increased autonomy is meant to enhance the universities’ 
capacity to face financial stringencies and new demands while strengthening 
organizational innovations. Outward, the traditional role of the state was squeezed to 
circuitous one as quasi independent public agencies came to the arena. A good instance in 
point of this is the establishment of the two major independent board steered agencies: 
Higher Education Strategy Center (HESC) & Higher Education Relevance & Quality 
Agency (HERQA) (now this agency is referred to as Education and Training Quality 
Assurance Agency (ETQAA)) to whom government’s traditional responsibility of 
devising national HE strategies, quality control & accreditation are entrusted (HEP 2003). 
With respect to funding, the reform agenda focuses importantly on diversifying financial 
resources and improving efficiency as the financial burden of massification on the 
government is increasingly becoming unbearable. It envisages the introduction of cost-
sharing by beneficiary students, the encouragement of income generation, improved 
financial autonomy, as well as improvements in efficiency (see Yizengaw 2003, Saint 
2004, Yizengaw 2007). Though its implementation was delayed till recent years, the 2003 
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proclamation also stipulated the move from the strict line
system (Yizengaw 2007).  All these endeavors have been reinforced by the recently 
revised 2009 proclamation which g
addition to strengthening the provisions of the 2003 statutory (see HEP 2009, Part Three 
for detail). All these reform rhetoric promote the adoption of private
universities. A good indication of this 
students enrolled on fee-paying evening and summer programs, making such students 
account nearly half of the enrolment in public institutions (Yizengaw 2007). 
reform deliberations indicate the 
that involves the deinstitutionalization of the mono
Interpretation of these underpinnings through Olsen’s (2007) visions of university 
organization points to the deliberation to make the universities as enterprises providing 
service to society. 
Figure 14 - Review of Ethiopian universities’ formal arrangement after the BPR initiative as 
interpreted through Olsen’s (2007) vision
  
Note – The depth of colors ranging from deep green to light green indicates the prevalent vision of 
university with deep green indicating dominant form on the one end of the continuum and 
light green indicating least one on the other end of the continuum.
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world for direction. Indeed, as has been the case for the developed world, HE in Ethiopia 
is in unprecedented crisis owing to more or less similar forces of intense massification and 
the subsequent austerity in funding.  Nevertheless, even if this drivers are central for the 
future pattern of the country’s HE sector as they did for the developed countries, this does 
not mean that the breakdown of how developed nations tackled the crisis of massification 
and the subsequent austerity in funding can successfully be applied in Ethiopia though 
important lessons could be learnt. Rather, as marked by the discussion on the status quo 
preceding the BPR reform, interpreting the dynamics of Ethiopian HEIs as a function of 
formal frameworks can be deceptive. Therefore, against the deliberations of the formal 
framework, a careful analysis of contextual settings and practical realities is needed to 
ascertain how far the ideals embodied in the contemporary reform rhetoric are manifested 
pragmatically.  
The foremost issue in this regard is the driving force behind such reforms. As opposed to 
the developed world’s HE reform which fundamentally emanated from the evolution of 
their socio-cultural, economic and political environments; the drive towards such 
organizational ideals in the developing world does not occur as an organic process but a 
product of imposition by supra-national forces such as World Bank and IMF (see Peters 
2001, Maassen 2003, Scott 1995, Vaira 2004). Acting as institutional carrier, these 
institutions bind their financial loans and support to the conformity of these countries’ 
institutional and organizational structures to the globally rationalized neoliberal ideals of 
market algorithm, minimalist state and corporate discourses of accountability, efficiency 
and effectiveness (Vaira 2004). In this regard, as a case in African countries in general, 
the influence of these institutions began to emerge in Ethiopia within changing political 
context since the late 1990’s more profoundly (see Common and Mengesha 2007). BPR 
initiative in Ethiopia is not exception to this sphere of influence as evidenced by the 
participation of these institutions in initiating the BPR reform.  
The reflection of such neoliberal driven reforms in HE is all about reducing state’s control 
in favor of market-like mechanism. This requires decentralization of power that has 
traditionally been the domain of central governments in developing world. Thus, the 
success of such reforms requires political and ideological drift from the conventionally 
held authoritarian culture to decentralization, strengthening of democracy and good 
governance for which case the Ethiopian government proved to lag so much behind over 
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the years (see The Report on the Practice of Human Right by US State Department and 
other international agencies over the past two decades for instance). Contrary to this, 
Pitcher (2004) relates the success of such reforms to government’s commitment. This 
problem of mismatch between what the reform requires and the government’s 
authoritarian culture transplants a potential discrepancy in the success of the endeavor. A 
good historical case from African experience is the instance in which a well-established 
supervisory model, let alone such creeping trial to instill new one, was abolished when 
found being incompatible with authoritarian culture in those African countries where the 
British model was initially implanted (see Neave and van Vught 1994). In a similar 
leaning, in Ethiopia too, this backdrop of power centralization has left long shadows of 
embedded impulse in the government’s deeds where strict and sometimes arbitrary 
interference over various aspects of the individual HEIs is still evident. For instance, the 
mandate of staff recruitment, which is exclusively given to institutions by the statutory, is 
still under the control of the Ministry of Education. A good case in point is recruitment of 
junior academic staffs and expatriates for all institutions by Ministry of Education. In a 
similar experience, though statutorily the institutions are granted considerable degree of 
autonomy in the use of their resources, strong government intervention has been 
evidenced. The same is true regarding the autonomy of institutions in academic matters 
such as curriculum issue; student enrollment and placement (see (Assefa 2008, Gemeda 
2008, Mehari 2010, Semela 2008). All these do not defy government’s critics for 
undermining the institutions’ autonomy. Rather the persistent governmental interventions 
divulge that universities autonomy in Ethiopia comes from the idea that government is 
overloaded and hence, technical decisions can be left to individual institutions. Thus, 
whenever deemed necessary, the government is seen as having the legitimacy to intervene.  
This normally holds among developing countries, where internalization of university as 
instrument dedicated to modernization and economic progress is the conception (Van 
Vught 1993).  In Ethiopia, it is evidenced not only in the government’s practice but also in 
its policy documents. For instance, in the country’s Education Sector Development 
Program I-III, HEIs are clearly designated as instruments for national purposes (see 
ETPTGE 1994, FDRE 2002a, FDRE 2002b, FDRE 2003, FDRE 2006). They are expected 
to actively participate in the social transformation, modernization and training of the 
country’s human resource as per the government’s rational plan indisputably. Universities 
are thus conceived as cadre of instruments that can be used to mobilize intellectual and 
technical resources to achieve national goals. This would eventually lead to Neave & Van 
Vught’s (1991) idea of inventionary state that attempts to influence the whole system’s 
dynamics and internal institutional affairs as opposed to neo
that conceive HEIs as autonomous service enterprises embedded in competitive system. 
Given all these, it is unrealistic to expect Ethiopian universities to become as autonomous 
as the formal framework designate.  
Figure 15 - Practical account of governance in Ethiopian universities after the BPR initiative 
as delineated by Oslen’s (2007) visions of university organization
 
 Note – The depth of colors ranging from deep green to light green indicates t
university with deep green indicating dominant form on the one end of the continuum and light 
green indicating least one on the other end of the continuum.
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by relatively autonomous players and change the rules as market engineer to level the 
pitch when the game is no longer able to lead to satisfactory results (see also De Boer and 
File 2009, Massen 2003, Santiago 2008). To move to such mechanism, not only the pitch 
and players in the sector need to be sufficiently capacitated but also the evolution of the 
market-mechanism should reach to a level strong enough to coordinate the system such as 
by stimulating demand for manpower, techniques and research generated products to 
which HEIs may in turn respond and thereby, generate revenue that may substitute state 
funding (Neave and Van Vught 1994). Nonetheless, at its present stage of development, 
the market mechanism in African countries in general is not deeply ingrained to avoid 
failure let alone in such quasi-public sectors, even in private sectors. In such 
circumstances, where the market mechanism isn’t dependable and where state is a major 
actor as interpreter and funder of societal demand, it is perhaps not surprising to see 
state’s role reinforcing behind the scene if not by a dint of formal decree.  
By the same logic, for such mechanism to work effectively, buffer organizations and 
interest groups should be able to actively take independent part so that the system’s 
balance will be kept. Any buffer body could keep its legitimacy only if it can sustain as 
neutral body standing between government and HEIs (Van Vught 1993). In this regard, 
the statutory in Ethiopia as mentioned elsewhere gave rise to the two independent board-
steered public institutions to whom devising the sector’s strategy and quality assurance is 
entrusted. Nonetheless, Van Vught (1993) stressed that in several countries such 
organizations appear either to be transformed to serve more directly government’s 
interests or to be removed. The experience in Ethiopia is not far from supporting this as 
the government often times tries to use such institutions as a sort of channel for social 
control or intimidate their independent exercise for political reasons (see Assefa 2008, 
Gemeda 2008 and Rahmato 2002).  
All these backdrops casts doubt on how far such externally initiated neo-liberal driven 
reforms could go in bringing about the desired change in Ethiopian HE sector. Indeed, the 
problem doesn’t lie with taking best practices from outside but with the way it is coupled 
with local contexts. Thus, such moves need to capture locally unique circumstances and 
realities that influence the development and integration of the HE system in the concerned 
countries. It requires not only commitment among governments but also structural and 
institutional adjustment in capacitating independent institutions and mentoring dependable 
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market mechanism. This comes through evolutionary leaping-frog adaptation process in a 
system that nurtures social and economic institutions to grow in an independent way. Till 
then, such winds of change blowing to developing countries will go on having hybrid 
manifestation in that in surface glance the system appears to have been gearing in line 
with global trends when in fact it is vicious circle back to mono-centric governmental role 
sarcastically. 
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5 Conclusionary Remark 
The implementation of BPR in Ethiopian universities offers an interesting glimpse on how 
organizations respond to external pressures in the strongly regulated developing world 
context. The conceptual framework provided insightful analytical tools not only to explain 
how the individual institutions dealt with the reform initiative but also the role played by 
the government. Though the government is formally designated to have a limited role, the 
analysis of the target universities response evidenced how decisive its role is in shaping 
the universities’ response. The mechanisms it employed are, however, different from what 
it has traditionally been using over the years. As opposed to its customary direct 
intervention actions, it used more sophisticated instruments ranging from regulative 
mechanisms such as revisiting the legal framework to less officious mechanisms such as 
providing trainings and conferences. In addition to this, it also played an important role in 
paving the way for mimetic mechanisms by promoting experience sharing among the 
institutions. This strong governmental manipulation eventually limited the repertoire of 
individual universities response to passive conformity in the form of simple acquiesce and 
compromise, leading to the concealment of institutional dissimilarities. Consequently, a 
more homogeneous inclination has been evidenced across the targeted universities 
ultimate arrangements.  
In line with this, the arrangements of all the three universities marked a clear departure 
from the collective and representative leadership to a more domineering executive 
leadership ideal. To this end, the structures in each university became less inclusive and 
more hierarchical in relative terms. Complimentary to this, decision-making organs from 
university level all the way down to the operating level academic units are established in a 
way that enable devolution of power to the lower levels. This eventually resulted in the 
concentration of power at the apex and bottom of the universities’ structure squeezing the 
college level’s role to the periphery. In a related move, the pattern of power distribution at 
each level is also found to tilt in favor of academic leaders at the expense of collegial 
academic councils though these bodies are still delineated to have important role.  
Within this homogeneous frame, however, the response of the universities is found to 
reflect the institutions’ background in terms of size, complexity and maturity. In this 
regard, of the three universities targeted, AAU’s downward hierarchical lineup is found to 
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have a slightly different and diversified arrangement in which attempt to couple the new 
managerialist orientation with the then collective leadership ideals in a more balanced way 
is made. Even though the vertical hierarchies of regulatory and executive power give way 
to laterally collegial structures in HU and MU as well, these two universities’ structures in 
general and the lower levels in particular have been found to be more selective and 
hierarchical when compared to AAU’s as the structures in these universities are not 
inclusive and accessible to all academic staffs.  
Nevertheless, when it comes to the level of change in real terms, a very fluid scenario has 
been uncovered. Though providing comprehensive assessment in this regard is beyond the 
scope and purpose of this study, the assessment of empirical functioning of the newly 
instilled provisions highlights how patchy the experience of BPR initiative in Ethiopian 
universities is in practical terms. Though successful in changing the formal organization 
of the universities, the governmental inducement and coercion has not up to now proved 
to be capable of generating the required change in the day-to-day dynamics of the 
institutions. As evidenced by the perception of sampled academic leaders and staffs of the 
target universities, the status quo is far from changing as the universities’ internal 
dynamics is still heavily conditioned by past rule of thumbs except in a handful aspects 
where the winds of the change is felt. Apart from this, the universities day to day 
organizational operandi is found to be entangling with the predicaments of the preceding 
system such as lack of productive administrative system to coordinate activities across the 
university, apparent trend to practically centralize administrative and academic decisions 
and interference of top officers in routines of lower units. This coupled with the pragmatic 
underpinnings emanating from the government’s lack of commitment to the ideals of 
power devolution pose serious doubt on whether the emerging pattern in the institutions 
day-to-day dynamics would be in line with the formal deliberation of the reform 
endeavors.  
Whether the status quo keeps on this way is what remains to be seen in time. The 
literature in HE, however, indicates how successful established traditions are in their 
adapting mechanism to have gotten past environmental pressures (see Clark 1983:183, 
Musselin 2005 for instance). Clark (1983) points to the organizational fragmentation 
aspect as miraculous blessing that incline HEIs adaptive capacity to bend and adapt in 
incremental way without dismantling their culture radically. Thus, no matter how well 
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intended as it may exceptionally be, undertaken reforms in the bottom heavy HE structure 
do not automatically imply their way as far down to the lower hierarchy as desired. 
Musselin (2005) underlined that it is the continuity of the old culture that prevails in real 
terms in the short run especially at the real operating level units.  In view of these, the 
BPR initiative in Ethiopian universities appears to have been caught in the ambush of 
these setbacks as the universities’ day-to-day dynamics reveals a hybrid glance of past and 
current trends.  However, the essence of the reform endeavor cannot be measured by its 
façade view but by the subsequent improvements or retrogression it brought practically. It 
is therefore interesting to examine more not only the institutionalization process of the 
newly introduced ideals but also how the introduction of these ideals affected the basic 
functions of the institutions – teaching-learning, research and community service. 
In general terms, in a system where the upper bodies are censured for undermining the 
autonomy of the lower units while the lower units in their part are also criticized for 
failing to take advantage of the new situation, a very confusing scenario where some 
elements are still conditioned by the past patterns is expectable. Change in a HE system 
where the state is omnipotent is not primarily the product of a process that involves 
adaptation and attempts to change the deliberations of the reform by the individual HEIs. 
Among other factors, it will be mainly the product of requirements and commitments 
coming from the state itself. Therefore, the Ethiopian HEIs’ internal dynamics become 
more evident and clear in the long run depending on the long-term commitment of 
stakeholders involved in general, the leadership of government incumbents and the 
respective institutions in particular to the ideals embodied in the reforms.  
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Appendixes  
Appendix A – Additional Tables to Data Analysis 
1. Opinion of academic staffs with respect to responsiveness, participatory and flexibility of 
institutional level governance in their university’s new system in comparison to the 
previous system.  
Participatory * Name of Institution 
Crosstab 
Count 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa 
University 
Mekele University 
Participatory 
Dissatisfied 10 15 17 42 
Neutral 7 13 9 29 
Satisfied 7 1 3 11 
Total 24 29 29 82 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.678a 4 .070 
Likelihood Ratio 8.466 4 .076 
N of Valid Cases 82   
a. 3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 3.22. 
Responsiveness * Name of Institution 
Crosstab 
Count 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa 
University 
Mekele University 
Responsiveness 
Dissatisfied 15 18 16 49 
Neutral 4 9 10 23 
Satisfied 5 2 3 10 
Total 24 29 29 82 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.004a 4 .405 
Likelihood Ratio 4.035 4 .401 
N of Valid Cases 82   
a. 3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 2.93. 
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Flexibility * Name of Institution 
Crosstab 
Count 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa 
University 
Mekele University 
Flexibility 
Disatisfied 12 21 18 51 
Nuetral 11 7 9 27 
Satisfied 1 1 2 4 
Total 24 29 29 82 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.376a 4 .497 
Likelihood Ratio 3.317 4 .506 
N of Valid Cases 82   
a. 3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 1.17. 
 
2. Cross tabulation for opinion of academic staffs regarding the governance practice of their 
respective university at institution level  
Collegial * Name of Institution 
Crosstab 
Count 
 Name of Institution Total 
AAU HU MU 
Collegial Least practiced 2 2 5 9 
Less frequently practiced 11 12 11 34 
Moderately practiced 6 14 12 32 
Frequently practiced 5 1 1 7 
Total 24 29 29 82 
Bureaucratic * Name of Institution 
Crosstab 
Count 
 Name of Institution Tot
al AAU HU MU 
Bureaucratic Moderately practiced 3 0 10 13 
Frequently practiced 11 16 14 41 
More frequently 
practiced 
10 13 5 28 
Total 24 29 29 82 
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Political * Name of Institution 
Crosstab 
Count 
 Name of Institution Total 
AAU HU MU 
Political Less frequently 
practiced 
1 0 3 4 
Moderately practiced 6 5 13 24 
Frequently practiced 6 12 9 27 
More frequently 
practiced 
11 12 4 27 
Total 24 29 29 82 
Anarchic * Name of Institution 
Crosstab 
Count 
 Name of Institution Total 
AAU HU MU 
Anarchic Least practiced 1 2 2 5 
Less frequently 
practiced 
7 14 8 29 
Moderately practiced 12 9 12 33 
Frequently practiced 3 4 4 11 
More frequently 
practiced 
1 0 3 4 
Total 24 29 29 82 
 
3. Academic staffs’ perception towards the level of centralization/decentralization in their 
respective university academic wing.  
Selecting College and School level academic leaders * Name of Institution 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa 
University 
Mekele 
University 
Selecting College and 
School level academic 
leaders 
Centralized 10 15 23 48 
Moderate 6 8 4 18 
Decentralized 8 6 2 16 
Total 24 29 29 82 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.671a 4 .046 
Likelihood Ratio 10.071 4 .039 
N of Valid Cases 82 
  
a. 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 4.68. 
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Selecting new faculty * Name of Institution 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa 
University 
Mekele 
University 
Selecting new faculty 
Centralized 16 17 19 52 
Moderate 5 9 5 19 
Decentralize 3 3 0 6 
Total 24 29 24 77 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.382a 4 .357 
Likelihood Ratio 6.093 4 .192 
N of Valid Cases 77 
  
a. 3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 1.87. 
 
 
Faculty promotion/tenure decisions * Name of Institution 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa 
University 
Mekele 
University 
Faculty promotion/tenure 
decisions 
Centralized 15 16 8 39 
Moderate 6 9 11 26 
Decentralized 3 4 9 16 
Total 24 29 28 81 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.727a 4 .102 
Likelihood Ratio 7.818 4 .098 
N of Valid Cases 81 
  
a. 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 4.74. 
 
 
Determining use of resources * Name of Institution 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa 
University 
Mekele 
University 
Determining use of 
resources 
Centralized 13 17 9 39 
Moderate 9 11 12 32 
Decentralized 2 1 8 11 
Total 24 29 29 82 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.647a 4 .047 
Likelihood Ratio 9.784 4 .044 
N of Valid Cases 82 
  
a. 3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 3.22. 
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Approving new academic programs and courses * Name of Institution 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa 
University 
Mekele 
University 
Approving new academic 
programs and courses 
Centralized 3 11 9 23 
Moderate 12 13 8 33 
Decentralize 9 5 11 25 
Total 24 29 28 81 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.574a 4 .108 
Likelihood Ratio 8.393 4 .078 
N of Valid Cases 81 
  
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 6.81. 
Deciding on routine academic issues * Name of Institution 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa 
University 
Mekele 
University 
Deciding on routine 
academic issues 
Centralized 11 13 7 31 
Moderate 5 9 7 21 
Decentralized 7 7 15 29 
Total 23 29 29 81 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.212a 4 .184 
Likelihood Ratio 6.281 4 .179 
N of Valid Cases 81 
  
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 5.96. 
4. Academic staffs’ perceptions towards structural provisions for staff participation in 
institutional management and decision making processes in target universities 
Lack of faculty involvement is not a problem in the university's current system in comparison to the 
previous one * Name of Institution 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa University Mekele University 
Lack of faculty involvment is not a 
problem in the university's current 
system in comparison to the 
previous one 
Disagree 9 13 20 42 
Nuetral 14 11 6 31 
Agree 1 4 3 8 
Total 24 28 29 81 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.974a 4 .062 
Likelihood Ratio 9.204 4 .056 
N of Valid Cases 81   
a. 3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 2.37. 
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The academic decision-making process is now more collective and collegial than it was in the previous 
system * Name of Institution 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa University Mekele University 
The academic decision-making 
process is now more collective 
and collegial than it was in the 
previous system 
Disagree 8 17 21 46 
Nuetral 8 5 5 18 
Agree 8 7 3 18 
Total 24 29 29 82 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.888a 4 .064 
Likelihood Ratio 9.243 4 .055 
N of Valid Cases 82   
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 5.27. 
Staffs have stronger voice in decision making process of the current system * Name of Institution 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa University Mekele University 
In comparison to the previous 
system, staffs have stronger 
voice in decision making process 
of the current system 
Disagree 11 20 19 50 
Nuetral 11 6 8 25 
Agree 2 3 2 7 
Total 24 29 29 82 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.355a 4 .360 
Likelihood Ratio 4.295 4 .368 
N of Valid Cases 82   
a. 3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5.  
Staffs have adequate level of representation in governing bodies at each level in the new system than in the 
previous system * Name of Institution 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa University Mekele University 
Staffs have adequate level of 
representation in governing 
bodies at each level in the new 
system than in the previous 
system 
Disagree 13 19 18 50 
Nuetral 10 10 11 31 
Agree 1 0 0 1 
Total 24 29 29 82 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.882a 4 .578 
Likelihood Ratio 2.927 4 .570 
N of Valid Cases 82   
a. 3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is .29. 
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The new system has more open and suitable structures for consultation and participation of academic 
staffs in setting institutional goals, plans and policy decisions * Name of Institution 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa University Mekele University 
The new system has more open 
and suitable structures for 
consultation and participation of 
academic staffs in setting 
institutional goals, plans and 
policy decisions 
Disagree 12 21 18 51 
Nuetral 11 8 11 30 
Agree 1 0 0 1 
Total 24 29 29 82 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.695a 4 .320 
Likelihood Ratio 4.771 4 .312 
N of Valid Cases 82   
a. 3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is .29. 
 
5. Staffs’ perception regarding leadership practice in their university 
The new system capacitates academic leaders to provide competent leadership more effectively and 
efficiently than the previous system * Name of Institution 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa 
University 
Mekele 
University 
The new system capacitates 
academic leaders to provide 
competent leadership more 
effectively and efficiently 
than the previous system 
Disagree 1 5 9 15 
Nuetral 9 14 14 37 
Agree 14 10 6 30 
Total 24 29 29 82 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.787a 4 .029 
Likelihood Ratio 11.456 4 .022 
N of Valid Cases 82 
  
a. 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 4.39. 
 
Academic leaders are less autocratic and more collegial in the new system than the previous * Name of 
Institution 
 Name of Institution Total 
Addis Ababa 
University 
Hawassa 
University 
Mekele 
University 
Academic leaders are less 
autocratic and more collegial 
in the new system than the 
previous 
Disagree 15 20 20 55 
Nuetral 8 7 9 24 
Agree 1 2 0 3 
Total 24 29 29 82 
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Chi-Square Tests
 Value 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.442a 
Likelihood Ratio 3.341 
N of Valid Cases 82 
 
a. 3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .88. 
 
Appendix B – Organizational Structure of target Universities
Appendix B – 1 Organizational Structure of Haile Selassie I University
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Appendix B – 2 - The New Organizational Structure of AAU 
1. Institution level organization structure 
 
 
2.  Prototype of a College Organization in the new AAU organizational arrangement 
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3. Prototype of a Faculty/School Organization in the new AAU organizational 
arrangement 
 
4. Prototype of a Department/Program Unit in the new AAU organizational arrangement 
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Appendix B – 3 - The New Organizational Structure of Hawassa University (HU) 
1. Institution level organization structure 
 
2. Prototype of a College and School Organization  
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3. Prototype of a School organization
Appendix B – 4 - The New Organizational Structure of 
1. Institution level organization structure
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2. Prototype of a College Organization 
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3. Prototype of School Organization 
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Appendix C – Structure of Ethiopian Education System 
 
Source - MOE (2011C) 
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Prior to 1994, the structure was divided into primary (1-6 grade), junior secondary (7-8 
grade), senior secondary (9-12 grade) and tertiary education (12+2 years–Diploma, 12+4 
years – Bachlores, 12+4+2 years – Masters and 12+4+2+4 – PhD level study) with 
national examinations given on completion of the first three levels. The new Education 
and Training Policy restructured this structure as pri-primary, primary (Grade 1-8), lower 
secondary (Grade 9-10), upper secondary (Grade 11-12), technical and vocational 
education and training (TVET) and tertiary education programmes in ascending order. 
According to the new education system, primary education lasts for eight years. It is 
divided into two cycles: basic education (Grades 1-4) and general education (Grades 5-8). 
Junior secondary schools no longer exist, as grade 7 and 8 have become the two upper 
classes of the second cycle of primary education. Secondary education is divided into two 
cycles: the first general secondary education (Grades 9 and 10), and the second cycle 
preparatory secondary education (Grades 11 and 12). After completing grade 10, students 
join either TVET programs or academic stream (preparatory education for university level 
study) based on their performance on Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate Examination 
(ESLCE). Those pupils who failed on the Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate 
Examination (ESLCE) can opt to attend technical and vocational education (TVET). There 
are 10+1year, 10+2 years, 10+3years in TVET program. The 1st -year and 2nd -year 
programmes result in a Level I and Level II Certificate, and 3-year programmes results in 
Diploma level certificate. Grade 11 and 12 prepares students to continue their studies at 
the higher education level. It offers a science option and a social science option. At the 
end of this cycle, students take the Ethiopian Higher Education Entrance examination to 
enter higher education institutions. University level education is offered through regular, 
evening or distance mode. As defined by the new structure, the first University level study 
leads to Bachelor's Degree after three years study. In Medicine, Veterinary Medicine, 
Engineering and some other professional fields, the professional qualification is conferred 
after five and more years of study. The second stage leads to a Master's Degree after a 
minimum of two years’ further study.  The Doctor of Philosophy is conferred after three 
years' study beyond the Master's degree.   
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Appendix D - Interview Guide and Questionnaire 
1. Interview Guideline on BPR reform in Ethiopian Universities  
The interview theme is categorized into six focal areas. The first theme is in relation to the 
antecedents and processes that led to the implementation of the reform in the universities. 
The remaining five are drafted in such a way that they reflect on the contents of the 
reform from different aspects of institutional governance. 
1. BPR process initiation and its current status in the universities 
2. The arrangement for institutions of governance within the universities 
3. Organization of academic units and their autonomy in the new arrangement 
4. The provisions for staff participation in institutional management and academic 
decision-making process  
5. The patterns of power distribution across a university hierarchy 
6. The similarity/difference of organizational arrangement across institutions 
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2. Questionnaire on BPR reform in Ethiopian Universities 
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Appendix F – Support Letter  
 
